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PERCEIVED HOMOSEXUALS:
LOOKING GAY ENOUGH FOR TITLE VII
BRIAN SOUCEK*
Under the conventional view of Title VII, gay and lesbian workers can bring
discrimination claims based on gender stereotyping but not sexual orientation.
This Article analyzes 117 court cases on gender stereotyping in the workplace
in order to show that the conventional view is wrong. In cases brought by
“perceived homosexuals,” courts distinguish not between gender stereotyping
and sexual orientation claims, but between two ways that violations of gender
norms can be perceived: either as something literally seen or as something
cognitively understood. This Article shows that plaintiffs who “look gay” often
find protection under Title VII, while plaintiffs thought to violate gender
norms—through known or suspected sexual activity, friendships, hobbies, or
choice of partner—almost never win.
By privileging appearances over identity, these cases run counter to theories
of antidiscrimination law that favor blindness and assimilation, and they
upend accounts of “covering” that are widely accepted in discussions of law
and sexuality. These cases reverse courts’ usual hostility to appearance claims,
especially Title VII challenges to makeup and grooming requirements, as well
as courts’ usual sympathy to claims based on activities like child rearing,
known to take place outside of work. Meanwhile, on a practical level, these
cases threaten to increase the salience of sexual orientation in the workplace;
help entrench the stereotypes they are meant to proscribe; and isolate the claims
of successful Title VII litigants from the more assimilationist demands made by
gay plaintiffs in areas like marriage, adoption, and military service. As courts
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have quietly begun granting protection to only the most visible subset of gay
workers, this Article asks: at what cost, both to LBGT workers and to ongoing
debates over the protections those workers should receive under federal law?
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“The world [t]hinks through its eyes . . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
If you look or act sufficiently “gay” at work, you might currently
find protection from discrimination in at least half of the nation’s
courts of appeals. If, however, your coworkers or employers simply
know or think you are gay, you are not only unprotected under
federal law, but your claim is that of a “bootstrapper” trying to force
sexual orientation into Title VII against the will of Congress.2
1. FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, MARY STUART 43 (Peter Oswald, trans., Oberon Books
Ltd. 2005) (1800).
2. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“Like other courts, we have . . . recognized that a gender stereotyping claim should
not be used to ‘bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.’” (quoting
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000))); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Appellants now ask us to employ the
disproportionate impact decisions as an artifice to ‘bootstrap’ Title VII protection for
homosexuals under the guise of protecting men generally.”), overruled by Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Pagan v. Holder, 741 F. Supp.
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Contrary to popular wisdom and most academic theorizing,
employment-discrimination law has become, for gays and lesbians, an
area not only where “appearances . . . matter,”3 but in fact where
appearances take precedence over knowledge, and one’s look and
affect receive more protection than one’s sexual identity. Under
federal law as interpreted by an increasing number of federal courts, gay
and lesbian workers can be fired, demoted, not hired, or openly
harassed because of their sexuality—unless the victims of discrimination
are sufficiently flamboyant (if male) or butch (if female). These courts
protect “actual or perceived sexual orientation”—the words come from
legislation repeatedly introduced in Congress4—only when an
employee’s sexuality is “perceived” through the senses as something that
can literally be seen or heard. What it might mean to look or sound
“gay,” or what courts seem to think it means, is a question on which this
Article will linger.
Title VII, federal law’s chief protection against employment
discrimination, does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation,5 and judges have almost uniformly declined to
enfold sexuality within Title VII’s “sex” prong.6 But, for the past two
decades, courts have recognized Title VII claims by employees who
are perceived to violate gender stereotypes.7 In recent years, gay and
lesbian employees have increasingly followed this course, describing
themselves as violators of gender stereotypes for the purpose of
federal employment-discrimination claims.8 Under what is now the
conventional view of Title VII, gender stereotyping and sexual

2d 687, 695 (D.N.J. 2010) (“This is a hollow attempt to . . . recast a sexual orientation
claim as a gender stereotyping claim. . . . The Court will not permit Plaintiff to
bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII by re-packaging her sexual
orientation claim as gender stereotyping.”).
3. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
4. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong.
§§ 4, 9 (as passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013).
5. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (protecting workers from discrimination
“because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”) For a discussion of
courts’ reluctance to view sexuality claims as sex-based claims, see infra notes 33–34
and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See, e.g., Edward J. Reeves & Lainie D. Decker, Before ENDA: Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity Protections in the Workplace Under Federal Law, 20 LAW & SEXUALITY
61, 69–73 (2011) (citing several recent cases, beginning in 1989, in which federal
courts held in favor of plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination based on a
failure to adhere to traditional gender stereotypes); Kristin M. Bovalino, Note, How
the Effeminate Man Can Maximize His Odds of Winning Title VII Litigation, 53 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1117, 1118 (2003) (noting “[a] recent surge of cases” that illustrate how courts
have become increasingly willing to recognize men’s claims of gender stereotyping).
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orientation comprise two categorically different kinds of
discrimination claims, and Title VII recognizes only the former.
The conventional view is wrong. The distinction it draws is both
conceptually untenable and descriptively inaccurate, as this Article
demonstrates through a study of five years’ worth of federal district
court opinions concerning gender stereotyping, as well as every
federal appellate decision that has combined both gender
stereotyping and sexuality. From these cases, the distinction that
emerges is not between gender stereotyping and sexuality, but
between two ways in which violations of gender stereotypes
concerning sexuality are perceived: either literally, as something
seen or heard, or cognitively, as when we “see” a point9 or “hear” a
concern10—that is, when we know or understand something.
To speak of “actual or perceived sexual orientation,” as the longstalled Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) repeatedly
does,11 would seem to use “perceived” in the cognitive sense,
referring not to voyeurism but to something known or thought—
possibly falsely—about a person’s sexual preferences. Surprisingly,
though, it is the literal perception of sexuality that pervades recent
Title VII case law and, more importantly, that marks those cases in
which plaintiffs win. As this Article shows, employees who manifest
traits coded as gay in observable ways at work often succeed under
Title VII. But when an employee’s sexuality is cognitively perceived—
when coworkers think that a man is sleeping with another man or
know that a woman lives with a female partner—courts refuse to
extend Title VII’s protections.
Things are different elsewhere in Title VII case law. In cases not
involving “perceived homosexuals,” known or knowable violations of
gender stereotypes—for example, by women known to have small
children at home—get no less protection than visible violations.12
9. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 110 (Mary McCarthy ed.,
Harcourt, Inc. 3d ed. 1981) (1971) (“[F]rom the outset in formal philosophy,
thinking has been thought of in terms of seeing . . . .”). Arendt contrasts “the Greek
vision of the true” with “the Jewish tradition of a God who is heard but not seen.”
Id. at 111.
10. Cf. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental requisite
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”).
11. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. §§ 4, 9 (as
passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013) (emphasis added) (proscribing several forms of
discrimination based on “actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity”);
cf. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (defining hate crimes as “[o]ffenses involving actual or
perceived race, color, religion, or national origin”); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3) (including
both “actual [and] perceived physical or mental impairment” within the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
12. Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235, 258 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (visual stereotyping about a female employee’s observable
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The anomalous privileging of appearances solely in cases involving
gay and lesbian workers should therefore come as a surprise, and not
just because it has not previously been shown in the comprehensive
way that this Article attempts. The phenomenon directly contradicts
Professor Kenji Yoshino’s widely accepted “covering” thesis, which
holds that plaintiffs in antidiscrimination cases are more successful
the more they downplay their sexuality.13 More generally, it runs
counter to leading theoretical accounts of antidiscrimination law,14 to
well-known (and often criticized) Title VII doctrine disfavoring
appearance claims,15 and, finally, to the law’s usual disdain for “mere
[a]esthetics.”16 Where the “dominant conception of American
antidiscrimination law”17 speaks in metaphors of blindness18 and aims
behavior and appearance), with Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist.,
365 F.3d 107, 114–15, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) (cognitive stereotyping of mothers). Back
and other motherhood cases are discussed below. See infra Part II.B.
13. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 850 (2002) (asserting that in
both the civil-service employment and custody/visitation contexts, gays and lesbians
who kept their homosexuality “discreet” were more likely to keep their jobs or
children, compared to those whose homosexuality appeared “open” or “flagrant”);
see also infra Part IV.A.3. (explaining Yoshino’s covering thesis in detail).
14. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the metaphor of a “color-blind” Constitution
and antidiscrimination law’s traditional attempt to transcend visible characteristics in
order to make judgments based on individual merit and intrinsic worth).
15. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the notorious failures of Title VII challenges
to grooming codes, uniform requirements, and other appearance regulations); see
also DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND
LAW 120–22 (2010) (providing a more comprehensive account of the failures of
appearance claims under Title VII).
16. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]he Court has chosen to deregulate the
[administration of the death penalty], replacing, it would seem, substantive
constitutional requirements with mere esthetics . . . .”); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91,
107 (1909) (describing a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision “which
[held] that the police power cannot be exercised for a merely æsthetic purpose”).
Although the Supreme Court once described “[a]esthetic and environmental wellbeing” as “important ingredients of the quality of life in our society,” Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972), the Court’s more recent standing cases have listed
“mere esthetic interests” as the flimsiest injuries still, perhaps barely, cognizable
under Article III, see, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009)
(allowing for standing when a harm “affects the recreational or even the mere esthetic
interests of the plaintiff”) (emphasis added)). The term “aesthetic” recurs as an insult
throughout Justice Thomas’s dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), in
which he labeled a law school’s interest in a racially diverse student body “aesthetic”
and thus “constitutionally irrelevant” and “ineffective[].” Id. at 354 n.3 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (2000) (emphasis omitted). Post does not endorse the
“dominant conception” he describes, arguing it “do[es] not correspond to the actual
shape of the law.” Id. at 23. This Article provides additional support for Post’s
descriptive claim.
18. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“Our Constitution is color-blind . . . .”); see also Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 236 (1971) (discussing antidiscrimination
theories that “treat all colors as normative equivalents”).
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at assimilation,19 the cases studied in this Article force employers to
look even harder at the visible (and often stereotyped) markers of
their employees’ sexual orientation.
Scholars have not previously confronted the theoretical and
doctrinal anomalies raised by these gender stereotyping cases, most
likely because the case law itself has not been thoroughly described,
at least in the years since gay employees—or a subset of them—began
receiving protection under Title VII. The first three Parts of this
Article attempt to fill this descriptive gap.
Part I explains the dilemma courts face when considering gender
stereotyping claims brought by gay plaintiffs. How can courts “strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes,”20 without, as Congress has never
explicitly done, writing into federal law protections against
stereotypes concerning sexuality? To show what courts have done in
the face of this dilemma, Part II offers close readings of two leading
appellate opinions—Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc.21 and Vickers v.
Fairfield Medical Center22—which, together, trace the distinction courts
have drawn between plaintiffs who “look gay” and those who are
merely known or suspected to be gay. Part III generalizes the
distinction separating Prowel from Vickers by examining five years’ worth
of federal district court opinions regarding gender stereotyping and
Title VII, as well as every federal appellate opinion, from any year,
involving both gender stereotyping and sexual orientation.
This study of recent case law demonstrates that Prowel and Vickers
reflect a broader trend. In cases involving sexuality, plaintiffs tend to
win if and only if they fail to conform to stereotypes in ways seen at
work. Claims based on stereotypes involving something known about
the plaintiff almost universally fail. In this regard, cases brought by
gay or allegedly gay plaintiffs differ significantly from stereotyping
cases in which sexual orientation does not arise. In the latter, as Part
III shows, known or suspected violations of gender norms are
protected almost as often as physically observable ones.

19. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption
and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 487 (1998) (describing
“assimilationist bias” as the judiciary’s withholding of protection from groups
characterized by traits that may be changed or hidden, which encourages individual
members of these groups to assimilate).
20. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978) (emphasis added) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,
1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
21. 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009).
22. 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Part IV shifts from the descriptive project to a normative one, first
by examining how the case law described in Parts II and III upends
standard theories of antidiscrimination law, well-established Title VII
doctrine, and prominent claims regarding sexuality and the law.
Worse, Part IV demonstrates that these cases threaten harm in
practice: they may hurt the very workers employment-discrimination
law is meant to protect. Part V briefly revisits these worries in light of
ENDA, a bill which would proscribe employment discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, both actual and perceived.23 The fact
that ENDA has protection against “perceived sexual orientation or
gender identity”24 at its heart suggests, somewhat ominously, that
even ENDA’s eventual passage might not put to rest the ambiguities
that so many courts have chosen to find in law’s metaphors of
perception. In the meantime, this Article, with its revisionist account
of who is currently protected under Title VII, seeks to reshape the
assumptions, shared by ENDA’s proponents and opponents alike,
regarding the status quo that ENDA seeks to alter.
I.

THE TITLE VII DILEMMA25

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects workers from
discrimination “because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”26 Sexual orientation and gender identity are not explicitly
named among the protected grounds. Since 1974, however, Congress
has made several attempts to amend Title VII27 or, since 1994, to
supplement it with an additional statute28 in order to protect employees’
sexual orientation, whether “real or perceived.”29 These attempts have
23. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. §§ 4, 9 (as
passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013).
24. Id.
25. In an Essay written after this Article but published shortly before it, Ian Ayres
and Richard Luedeman offer a similar description of the dilemma lower courts face
interpreting Title VII in the wake of Price Waterhouse. See Ian Ayres & Richard
Luedeman, Tops, Bottoms, and Versatiles: What Straight Views of Penetrative Preferences
Could Mean for Sexuality Claims Under Price Waterhouse, 123 YALE L.J. 714, 717–18
(2013) (describing what they call the “Price Waterhouse dilemma”).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
27. See, e.g., Equality Act of 1974, H.R. 14752, 93d Cong. (1974) (proposing to
amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a), to include “sexual
orientation” as an additional protected trait). The Equality Act of 1974 marked the
first proposal of a federal “gay rights” bill. William C. Sung, Note, Taking the Fight
Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining “Because of Sex” To Include Gender Stereotypes,
Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 495–96 (2011).
28. The most recent attempt is the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013,
S. 815.
29. The first reference to “perceived” sexual orientation appeared in 1994, in
what was also the first proposed standalone law.
See Employment NonDiscrimination Act of 1994, S. 2238, 103d Cong. § 18(12) (1994) (defining “sexual
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repeatedly failed in Congress, though the most recent iteration of ENDA
won approval in the Senate in November 2013.30 Gender identity was
added to the version of ENDA first proposed in 2007.31
In the absence of ENDA or a similar law, the federal courts have
almost universally refused to derive protection for sexual orientation
from Title VII’s “sex” prong. In a well-known 1979 case, DeSantis v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,32 the Ninth Circuit held that “Title
VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’ discrimination applies only to
discrimination on the basis of gender and should not be judicially
extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality.”33
Since then, every other circuit to address the issue has agreed: “Title
VII does not prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual
orientation.”34 The fact that Congress has repeatedly failed to
orientation” to include “lesbian, gay, bisexual, or heterosexual orientation, real or
perceived, as manifested by identity, acts, statements, or associations”); see also Jill D.
Weinberg, Gender Nonconformity: An Analysis of Perceived Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity Protection Under the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 9
n.36 (2009) (noting that all later versions of ENDA incorporated “[p]erceived sexual
orientation discrimination”).
30. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815. In 1996, a previous
version of ENDA came within one vote of passage in the Senate on the very day the
Senate passed the Defense of Marriage Act. Weinberg, supra note 30, at 9–10 (citing
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996)).
31. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong.
§ 3(a)(6) (2007); Weinberg, supra note 29, at 10.
32. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979), overruled by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc.,
256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
33. Id. at 329–30 (footnote omitted); see also Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F.
Supp. 1098, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (“Whether or not the Congress should, by law,
forbid discrimination based upon affectional or sexual preference of an applicant, it
is clear that the Congress has not done so.” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
aff’d, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978). In DeSantis, the Ninth Circuit literally conflated a
sexual orientation claim with a claim of gender non-conforming appearances:
decided together with DeSantis, whose plaintiff was gay, was a second case, Strailey v.
Happy Times Nursery School, Inc., whose plaintiff was fired from his teaching position
“because he wore a small gold ear-loop to school prior to the commencement of the
school year.” DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 328. The Ninth Circuit held that “discrimination
because of effeminacy, like discrimination because of homosexuality[,] . . . does not fall
within the purview of Title VII.” Id. at 332. The Ninth Circuit has since overruled the
latter holding in the wake of Price Waterhouse. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875.
34. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (calling the law “wellsettled in this circuit and in all others to have reached the question”); see, e.g.,
Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Title VII does
not . . . provide for a private right of action based on sexual orientation
discrimination. As such, to the extent [the plaintiff] seeks to have this court
judicially amend Title VII to provide for such a cause of action, we decline to do so.
It is wholly inappropriate, as well as constituting a clear violation of the separation of
powers, for this court, or any other federal court, to fashion causes of action out of
whole cloth, regardless of any perceived public policy benefit.”).
A similar logic, ascribing to Congress’s inaction on ENDA an affirmative intent not
to extend Title VII’s protections, has led courts, until recently, to deny claims
brought by transsexual and transgender plaintiffs. Compare Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Congress has not shown any
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override courts’ narrow reading of Title VII has only entrenched that
reading further.35
Only one federal court has departed from this consensus. In a
2002 harassment case, a magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Oregon found it likely that the defendant “would
not have acted as she (allegedly) did if Plaintiff were a man dating a
woman, instead of a woman dating a woman.”36 Had that been the
case, the court concluded, “then Plaintiff was discriminated against
because of her gender.”37 This opinion has remained a lonely outlier
for over a decade.
Alongside the nearly unanimous refusal to recognize sexuality and
gender identity claims, another line of cases has offered a far more
expansive interpretation of Title VII’s sex prong. This series begins
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,38 in which a woman who was denied partnership at her
accounting firm claimed that she had been the victim of “sex
stereotyping,” and thus, of discrimination “because of sex.”39 Ann
Hopkins, the plaintiff, had been praised as “an outstanding
professional” who had secured more major contracts than any of her
competitors for partnership.40 But she was also criticized as an “overly
aggressive, . . . tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed”
manager.41 Hopkins received evaluations suggesting that she “walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled,” and “take a course at charm school.”42

intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ to its traditional meaning.”), with Schroer
v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306–07 (D.D.C. 2008) (complaining that “courts
have allowed their focus on the label ‘transsexual’ to blind them to the statutory
language” of Title VII), and Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL
1435995, at *11 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012) (“[I]ntentional discrimination against a
transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by definition,
discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’ and such discrimination therefore violates Title
VII.”). For a discussion of the meaning of Congressional inaction, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988).
35. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“Congress has continued to reject these amendments even after courts have
specifically held that Title VII does not protect transsexuals from discrimination.”).
36. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1223 (D.
Or. 2002).
37. Id.
38. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
39. Id. at 231–32, 241, 250 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
40. Id. at 234.
41. Id. at 235.
42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Six members of the Court found considerations like these to be
impermissible under Title VII.43 Writing for four Members of the
Court, Justice Brennan broadly declared:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group, for “‘[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”44

It is Justice Brennan’s sweeping prohibition of disparate treatment
based on stereotypes that makes Price Waterhouse such a crucial case
for gay workers. Although it took courts some time to realize the full
implications of the opinion,45 Price Waterhouse, on its face, makes it
illegal to base employment decisions on gender stereotypes, whatever
those may be.46 Thus, Title VII’s protections should extend however
43. See id. at 231 (plurality opinion) (written by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens); id. at 258 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
44. Id. at 251 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting City of
L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). Justices
White and O’Connor concurred in the judgment, and neither of their opinions
suggests any disagreement with the plurality’s “entire spectrum” language. It is worth
noting as well that the “entire spectrum” claim garnered a majority of the Court in
Manhart, the case which was quoted by Justice Brennan’s Price Waterhouse opinion and
which was reaffirmed by five justices, with the words “entire spectrum” italicized, in
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981).
45. In 1995, six years after Price Waterhouse, Mary Anne Case was still envisioning
Title VII protections for effeminate men as a future prospect. See Mary Anne C.
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (arguing that Title VII
language and case law “already provide the necessary protection to both effeminate
men and feminine women, as well as their masculine counterparts,” and that “a
reconceptualization of the existing law” could allow courts to enforce such
protection if they applied the statute correctly); see also Katherine M. Franke, The
Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 96 (1995) (“Notwithstanding the direction in which Price Waterhouse seems to
urge equality jurisprudence, many courts are reluctant to relinquish the conventions
that femininity belongs to women and that masculinity belongs to men.”).
Also in 1995, Francisco Valdes could categorically claim that “stereotype analysis
never has been applied successfully to sex/gender stereotypes perceived . . . as
implicating . . . sexual orientation.” Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 316 (1995). At the time, the
leading case involving the gender stereotyping of a gay plaintiff was Dillon v. Frank,
No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992), in which the plaintiff
“contended that he was . . . not deemed ‘macho’ enough by his co-workers for a man,
and that the verbal abuse [he experienced] resulted from this stereotyping.” Id. at
*5. Dillon lost, as he failed to show that “his practices” would have been deemed
“acceptable in a female.” Id. at *9–10.
46. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007)
(interpreting Price Waterhouse as “establishing that Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’
encompasses both the biological differences between men and women and gender
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widely the spectrum of sexual stereotypes does. For Ann Hopkins,
the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, the spectrum included stereotypes
about how women should walk, talk, and dress.47 It also included
personality traits such as aggressiveness.48 Later decisions have
proscribed employment actions based on stereotypes not tied to an
employee’s appearance or behavior at work, such as stereotypes that
mothers should remain home with their children.49 And since Title
VII protects both women and men from sex-based discrimination by
people of either sex,50 the stereotypes proscribed by Title VII clearly
include those about femininity and masculinity alike.51
As may already be clear, the two lines of cases just described lie on
a collision course. The gender stereotyping spectrum described in
Price Waterhouse seems to include the gender stereotype that, as one
district court put it, “real men should date women, and not other
men.”52 In that court’s words:
discriminations, i.e., discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical
gender norms”).
47. As Mary Anne Case has sharply observed, the record before the Supreme
Court included nothing about Ann Hopkins’s actual appearance. Case, supra note
45, at 61. Thus, its holding cannot be limited to those who violate gendered
appearance norms only to the degree that Hopkins may have. As Case has written:
“the Court did not find as a matter of fact that Hopkins’s appearance was appropriate
for her sex; it held as a matter of law that it constituted sex discrimination for her
employer to require that it be so.” Id. at 49 (footnote omitted).
48. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234–35 (plurality opinion) (referring to
comments made by Hopkins’s coworkers that she was at times “abrasive[],” “unduly
harsh,” and “impatient”).
49. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113
(2d Cir. 2004) (holding that “stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is a form of
gender discrimination” in an employment-discrimination suit brought by a school
psychologist who was fired based on her employer’s belief that she, as a new mother,
could not devote the necessary time and effort to her career).
50. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78–79 (1998)
(holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination against both men and women and
that “nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination ‘because of . . .
sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same sex”).
51. See generally Case, supra note 45 (“[S]hocking though it may be to some
sensibilities, not only masculine women such as Hopkins, but also effeminate men,
indeed even men in dresses, should already unequivocally be protected under
existing law from discrimination on the basis of gender-role-transgressive behavior.”).
52. Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002); see also Rosado v.
Am. Airlines, 743 F. Supp. 2d 40, 58 (D.P.R. 2010) (noting but declining to reach the
Centola court’s equation of homosexuality and gender nonconformity); Silvia A. Law,
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 196
(“[H]omosexuality is censured because it violates the prescriptions of gender role
expectations. . . . Real men are and should be sexually attracted to women, and real
women invite and enjoy that attraction.”); Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the
Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1,
25 n.96 (1992) (“Price Waterhouse . . . implies that the use of the stereotype that men
and women should be heterosexual violates Title VII.”); Valdes, supra note 45, at 315
(“The Court’s broad language [in Hopkins and Manhart] suggests that a principled
and informed application of this stereotype analysis would include stereotypes
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Conceivably, a plaintiff who is perceived by his harassers as
stereotypically masculine in every way except for his actual or
perceived sexual orientation could maintain a Title VII cause of
action alleging sexual harassment because of his sex due to his
failure to conform with sexual stereotypes about what ‘real’ men do
or don’t do.53

Indeed, if sexual stereotypes include societal beliefs that men should
be macho, women should be feminine, and everyone should be
attracted to the people of the opposite sex, then under Price
Waterhouse, Title VII should protect not only heterosexual men who
are effeminate and women with masculine traits, but gay, lesbian, and
transgender employees as well.
This, then, is the dilemma. Following Price Waterhouse to its logical
conclusion would appear to require that sexual orientation be
brought, along with the rest of the spectrum of gender stereotypes,
under the protective umbrella of Title VII. But courts have almost
universally held that sexual orientation does not fall under Title VII,
as shown by Congress’s repeated failure to include it there
explicitly.54 The challenge facing the lower courts since Price
Waterhouse is finding a way to protect against the entire spectrum of
gender stereotyping while scrupulously not protecting against the
stereotype that people should be attracted only to those of the
opposite gender.55
that . . . link social gender atypicality with minority sexual orientation.”); I. Bennett
Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158, 1183 (1991)
(arguing that if a firm refuses a male employee “partnership solely because he
engaged in same-sex activity, the firm would be engaging in impermissible sex
stereotyping, refusing him partnership because ‘real’ men do not have sex with
men”); Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing GenderConforming and Gender-Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
465, 492 (describing as “the ultimate gender stereotype” the belief that “a person
belies his or her gender when that person seeks to engage in a sexual relationship
with a person of the same sex”).
53. Centola, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 410. Not all courts have adopted this rationale.
See, e.g., Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n, 432 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011) (“For
all we know, [the plaintiff] fits every male ‘stereotype’ save one—sexual
orientation—and that does not suffice to obtain relief under Title VII.”).
54. Compared to sexual orientation cases, gender identity cases have had far
more success under stereotyping theories. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312,
1317–18 (11th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with three courts of appeals and five district
courts that have held that “[a]ll persons, whether transgender or not, are protected
from discrimination on the basis of gender stereotype”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378
F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (declaring that earlier decisions denying protection to
transgender employees were “eviscerated by Price Waterhouse”).
55. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“[Defendant] argues persuasively that every case of sexual orientation
discrimination cannot translate into a triable case of gender stereotyping
discrimination, which would contradict Congress’s decision not to make sexual
orientation discrimination cognizable under Title VII.”).

SOUCEK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

PERCEIVED HOMOSEXUALS

4/2/2014 2:43 PM

727

As Part II and especially Part III show, courts have overwhelmingly
resolved this dilemma in one particular way. Before examining this
“solution,” however, it is worth looking briefly at two other possible
ways out of the Title VII dilemma, if only to show that courts’
preferred course was not inevitable.
The first of these routes would abandon the notion that federal law
does not protect gays and lesbians from discrimination based on
sexuality. Courts could do this on their own, should they take Price
Waterhouse and its progeny to their logical conclusion.56 Courts might
find, for example, that Congress’s failure to “correct” the Price
Waterhouse Court’s broad proscription of gender stereotyping is no
less meaningful than Congress’s failure to enact ENDA.
The less controversial way down this route, however, would be for
Congress to enact ENDA and do away with the dilemma entirely. Yet
some worry that ENDA’s passage might eliminate both horns of the
dilemma, not just one: by protecting sexual orientation and gender
identity under a new law, codified separately from Title VII’s “sex”
protections,57 ENDA could be interpreted as a repudiation of the
gender stereotyping theories that have bridged these concepts thus
far. Intersectional claims—those brought by lesbians, for example—
could also find themselves in danger of falling between the cracks of
the two distinct laws.58
These worries aside, ENDA provides the clearest solution to the
Title VII dilemma. The point here is not to advocate for ENDA,
however. This Article’s intervention into the ongoing debate over
ENDA’s passage is more indirect: its descriptive account of recent
Title VII case law shows that the pre-ENDA status quo is significantly
56. See Centola, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 410; Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country
Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Or. 2002) (“Cagle repeatedly harassed (and
ultimately discharged) Heller because Heller did not conform to Cagle’s stereotype
of how a woman ought to behave. Heller is attracted to and dates other women,
whereas Cagle believes that a woman should be attracted to and date only men.”).
57. In this regard, ENDA would be like the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (2012)), which added protections against disability discrimination outside of
Title VII, rather than the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555,
92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)), which clarified that, within Title VII,
“[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”
58. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction on Title VII, 103
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 214 (2008) (“The same fate awaits lesbian plaintiffs if
ENDA is passed as a stand-alone statute rather than as a gender amendment to Title
VII: if straight women and gay men have fared well, the lesbian plaintiff will lose on
both ENDA and Title VII counts. . . . [H]aving separate statutes with separate
remedial structures will make it even more important for the factfinder to isolate the
claims, parse the evidence more finely, and ignore intersectionality.”). For more on
intersectionality, see infra note 90.
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different than those on either side of the debate seem to realize.
Members of Congress have spent nearly forty years debating whether
protections like those in ENDA are worth having. Meanwhile, what
this Article shows is that protections are already being offered by courts
to a subset of gay and lesbian workers—a subset that would surely
surprise ENDA’s supporters and opponents both, if they only knew.59
Coming back, then, to the alternate ways out of the Title VII
dilemma: the second of these is to deny the first premise—the
notion that Title VII strikes at the entire spectrum of gender
stereotyping. This argument takes the form of a reductio: if
prohibiting the entire spectrum of gender stereotyping leads to the
conclusion that employers cannot discriminate against homosexuals,
then this understanding of gender stereotyping must be wrong. Or,
as Judge Posner, the leading advocate of this solution, has put it:
“case law has gone off the tracks in the matter of ‘sex stereotyping’”
when it is interpreted to imply “a federally protected right for male
workers to wear nail polish and dresses and speak in falsetto and
mince about in high heels.”60
According to Posner, gender
stereotyping in Price Waterhouse is properly understood as evidence of
sex discrimination, not itself a “subtype of sexual discrimination.”61
Thus, while the gender stereotyping of Ann Hopkins might have
suggested that illegal sex discrimination was afoot at Price
Waterhouse, gender stereotyping would itself be allowed under Title
VII in contexts such as single-sex workplaces where, according to
Judge Posner, discrimination between the sexes is not possible.62
Judge Posner’s approach to gender stereotyping has its critics and
vulnerabilities. First, Posner fails to grasp all the ways in which
59. This issue is discussed more fully infra Part V.
60. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066–67 (7th Cir.
2003) (Posner, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 1067. Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse provides
some support for Judge Posner’s position:
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove
that gender played a part in a particular employment decision. The plaintiff
must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its
decision. In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be
evidence that gender played a part.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion).
However, “remarks” play a different role in a failure-to-promote case, such as Price
Waterhouse, than they do in a harassment case, such as Hamm. Where such remarks
may simply provide evidence of discrimination in the former, in the latter kind of
case they actually constitute the harassment that, if pervasive or severe enough, Title
VII prohibits. See Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1062 n.3 (suggesting that harassment that is
severe enough “to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment” would constitute a Title VII violation (quoting
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986))).
62. Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1068.
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discrimination within a single-sex workforce can be used to keep that
workforce single-sex, thereby discriminating against the other sex. As
Ann McGinley has argued, “permitting discrimination against
effeminate men is a means of enforcing the masculinity of the job
which, in turn, creates barriers not only to effeminate men, but also
to women who would be interested in the job.”63 Early Title VII cases
brought by married stewardesses64 provide an example. Airlines that
fired flight attendants when they married may have been
discriminating among women, not between women and men. But by
reinforcing the notion that flight attendants must appear sexually
available to (presumably heterosexual) male customers, airlines were
also implicitly telling men not to apply for such work.65
Judge Posner’s account is hobbled further by his belief that postPrice Waterhouse case law only “protects heterosexuals who are victims of
‘sex stereotyping’ or ‘gender stereotyping.’”66
Posner wrongly
assumes that because homosexuality is not protected under Title VII,
homosexuals must not be either. From this erroneous starting point,
Posner draws implications that he rightly finds absurd. Repeating just
one of his examples: “If a court of appeals requires lawyers
presenting oral argument to wear conservative business dress, should
a male lawyer have a legal right to argue in drag provided that the
court does not believe that he is a homosexual, against whom it is
free to discriminate?”67 Judge Posner correctly recognizes that if this
were the law, employers would be able to establish a defense by
introducing evidence of the plaintiff’s homosexuality.68 A perverse

63. Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and
Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 744 (2010).
64. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1348 (2012) (asserting that “the EEOC found in its first year that
complaints of ‘loss of jobs due to marriage or pregnancy’ outnumbered any other
type of sex-based complaint,” partly due to the “tenacity” of flight attendants who
challenged “airline policies that terminated the employment of stewardesses when
they married or reached their early thirties”).
65. Of course, men were also explicitly told not to apply. Pan Am, for example,
had a no male flight attendant policy until 1971, when the Fifth Circuit struck it
down in Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), itself a
notable gender stereotyping opinion due to its refusal to credit customers’
stereotyped preferences to justify the claim that being female was a “bona fide
occupational qualification” for airline flight attendants. Id. at 386, 389; see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012) (allowing sex-based employment decisions when “sex . . .
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business”).
66. Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1066 (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 1067.
68. Id.
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incentive to launch inquisitions into litigants’ sexuality would result.69
An analogous argument—that this kind of inquiry perversely serves to
heighten the salience of characteristics that the law and most employers
ordinarily try to downplay within the workplace—is made below.70
Posner furthermore identifies a second ugly consequence: the
“gratuitous disparagement of homosexuals” that results when
plaintiffs subjected to gay slurs are pushed towards claiming not only
that they are straight, but also that, because they are straight, the gay
slurs flung at them are particularly insulting.71 “[A]s if [the slurs]
were unwounding when directed at a homosexual male,” Posner
empathetically notes.72 Again, Posner hints at, but does not develop,
a theme returned to below: the way current gender stereotyping case
law might cause gay and straight employees to emphasize, or even
exaggerate, the differences between them.73
The absurdities Posner identifies vanish if we remove the premise
on which they are built—that gay or lesbian plaintiffs somehow
cannot bring gender stereotyping claims. As Parts II and III show,
courts throughout the country have rejected Posner’s premise in no
uncertain terms.74 But once courts stop precluding homosexuals
from bringing gender stereotyping claims, the dilemma returns in
full force. So for a third time, we have to ask how Title VII, after Price
Waterhouse, can protect against the entire spectrum of gender
69. Id. (“Inevitably a case such as this impels the employer to try to prove that the
plaintiff is a homosexual (the employer’s lawyer actually said at the argument that a
plaintiff’s homosexuality would be a complete defense to a suit of this kind) and the
plaintiff to prove that he is a heterosexual, thus turning a Title VII case into an
inquiry into individuals’ sexual preferences—to what end connected with the policy
of the statute I cannot begin to fathom.”). In fact, this kind of inquisition is already
common in Title VII cases, but not for the reason Posner identifies. While Posner
discusses the sexuality of the plaintiff, cases in which same-sex harassment is alleged
often turn on the sexuality of the defendant due to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), which permits such
claims to succeed “if there [is] credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.”
Id. at 80.
70. See infra Part IV.A.1; see also Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J.
2061, 2063 (2003) (analyzing and challenging “[o]ne of American society’s most
cherished beliefs[:] that the workplace is—or should be—asexual”).
71. Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1067.
72. Id. at 1067–68.
73. See infra Part IV.B.3.
74. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“There is no basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion that an
effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender stereotyping claim while an
effeminate homosexual man may not.”); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d
1061, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (“[A]n employee’s
sexual orientation is irrelevant for purposes of Title VII. It neither provides nor
precludes a cause of action for sexual harassment. That the harasser is, or may be,
motivated by hostility based on sexual orientation is similarly irrelevant, and neither
provides nor precludes a cause of action.”).
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stereotyping without protecting against the stereotype that, for
example, “real men” are attracted to women. The following two Parts
describe the unlikely course courts have taken in attempting to
escape the Title VII dilemma.
II. TWO WAYS OF PERCEIVING GENDER STEREOTYPES
In cases brought by perceived homosexuals—and only in those
cases—courts have chosen to redefine the gender stereotyping
spectrum so as to limit actionable gender stereotyping to behavior
and appearances that are observable at work. Having thus narrowed
the spectrum, courts are able to treat discrimination based on gender
nonconformity outside the workplace as non-actionable sexual
orientation discrimination. The resulting doctrinal story treats
gender stereotyping as something categorically distinct from sexual
orientation discrimination.
This distinction cannot hold. It is vulnerable from both sides, as the
cases that follow show.75 On the one hand, beliefs about sexuality
often, if not always, involve gender stereotypes regarding who men and
women should be attracted to. Courts fence these off from the
stereotyping spectrum solely by fiat. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit recently and revealingly wrote: “For all we know, [the
plaintiff] fits every male ‘stereotype’ save one—sexual orientation—
and that does not suffice to obtain relief under Title VII.”76
On the other hand, many of the claims that are allowed to remain
on the stereotyping spectrum implicate sexual orientation. As the first
case discussed below demonstrates, one of the chief ways in which a
worker can violate gender stereotypes is by looking or acting “gay.”77
And this is not necessarily the same thing as looking or behaving like
someone of the opposite gender. To be as crudely stereotypical as
some of the cases that follow: A man who speaks with a lisp or obsesses
about Liza Minnelli does not exhibit feminine traits. But nor would
society see him as stereotypically masculine. Instead, his gender
nonconformity, such as it is, stems from being perceived as “gay.”78

75. See infra Parts II–III.
76. Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n, 432 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011).
77. See supra Part II.A (discussing Prowel, 579 F.3d 285).
78. David Halpern makes a similar point somewhat more vividly:
No one will look at you aghast . . . if you dare to imply that a guy who
worships divas, who loves torch songs or show tunes, who knows all of Bette
Davis’s best lines by heart, or who attaches supreme importance to fine
points of style or interior design—no one will be horrified if you imply that
such a man might, just possibly, not turn out to be completely straight.
DAVID M. HALPERIN, HOW TO BE GAY 9 (2012).
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If the gender stereotypes recognized by courts include stereotypes
about looking or sounding gay—and examples of this will multiply in
Part III—then the sharp divide between gender stereotyping and
sexuality claims that the official doctrinal story insists upon must be
illusory.
What courts actually exclude from the stereotyping
spectrum is not sexuality, but stereotypes about sexuality whose
violations are known rather than seen. As the two sections that follow
explain, the real distinction is between perception that occurs
through the senses and that which is merely known.
A. Sensible Perception: Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc.
Before being laid off from his job and becoming a plaintiff in a
Title VII suit, Brian Prowel worked for thirteen years at Wise Business
Forms in Butler, Pennsylvania.79 He spent his final seven years at
Wise “operat[ing] a machine called a nale encoder, which encodes
numbers and organizes business forms.”80
According to his deposition testimony, Prowel did not “fit in” with
his male coworkers.81 Whereas his colleagues hunted, fished, drank
beer, and liked football,82
Prowel testified that he had a high voice and did not curse; was very
well-groomed; wore what others would consider dressy clothes; was
neat; filed his nails instead of ripping them off with a utility knife;
crossed his legs and had a tendency to shake his foot “the way a
woman would sit”; walked and carried himself in an effeminate
manner; drove a clean car; had a rainbow decal on the trunk of his
car; talked about things like art, music, interior design, and decor;
and pushed the buttons on the nale encoder with “pizzazz.”83

Not coincidentally, Prowel’s coworkers perceived him—
accurately—to be gay.84 The Third Circuit claimed that “Prowel was
‘outed’ at work when a newspaper clipping of a ‘man-seeking-man’ ad
was left at his workstation with a note that read: ‘Why don’t you give
him a call, big boy.’”85
Coworkers called Prowel “Princess,”
“Rosebud,” or sometimes just “faggot.”86 They left a feathered tiara

79. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 286.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 287.
82. Id. (offering Prowel’s description of “the ‘genuine stereotypical male’ at the
plant,” which he described as “everything I wasn’t”).
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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and lubricant on his nale encoder and wrote messages in the
bathroom claiming that he had AIDS.87
The Third Circuit found sufficient “evidence of harassment based
on gender stereotypes” for Prowel to survive summary judgment.88
Suggesting that a jury would need to apply a mixed-motive analysis,
the court pointed to allegations that “Prowel was harassed because he
did not conform to Wise’s vision of how a man should look, speak,
and act,” not just because he was gay.89
As its name implies, a mixed-motives analysis prohibits harassment
or adverse employment decisions that spring from a mix of motives,
legitimate and proscribed.90 In Prowel, sexuality was the legally
permissible motive for harassing and firing Brian Prowel; gender
stereotyping was the motive forbidden by Title VII.91 The Prowel court
considered a second mixed-motive claim as well: sexual orientation
discrimination plus religious discrimination.92 Yet the Third Circuit
found those two claims to be coextensive, and dismissed them as a
result. Prowel, the court said, had identified only one religious
disagreement with his employer: their respective beliefs about
homosexuality.93 Since “Prowel’s religious harassment claim [was]
based entirely upon his status as a gay man,” the court dismissed it as
“a repackaged claim for sexual orientation discrimination.”94
87. Id. at 287–88.
88. Id. at 291–92.
89. Id. at 292.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (making it unlawful for sex to be a
“motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice”). For a discussion of the evidentiary requirements for
submitting mixed-motive analysis instructions to the jury, see Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–101 (2003), in which the Court held that, to obtain a § 2000e2(m) jury instruction, “a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice.’” Id. at 101.
Zachary Kramer has described claims such as those brought in Prowel as
“intersectional discrimination claims.” Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title
VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 216–17 (2009) (drawing on the extensive literature
regarding claims, such as those brought by black women, in which multiple Title VII
categories intersect). See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1242–44 (1991) (offering a seminal discussion of intersectionality). It is
unclear, however, that intersectionality—which usually refers to two protected
characteristics—is the proper description of cases that, as here, involve one protected
and one unprotected characteristic.
91. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92. See Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292.
93. Id. at 292–93.
94. Id. at 293; see also Recent Case, Third Circuit Issues Split Decision in Case
Involving Gay Man’s Harassment Claims—Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 123
HARV. L. REV. 1027, 1034 (2010) (“[The court’s] dismissal of Prowel’s religious
nonconformity claim suggests that it still may not allow claims in which a person
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The lesson here is that an employee cannot bring a mixed-motive
claim if the illicit motive is coextensive with the permissible one.
Prowel’s religious discrimination claim highlights the fact that a
gender stereotyping claim cannot reduce, without remainder, to a
claim about sexuality discrimination. Prowel itself, however, presents
the opposite situation of a sexuality claim that threatens to reduce to
a gender stereotyping claim. Since the Prowel court was not entirely
clear about this, it is worth analyzing its opinion a bit more closely.
The Third Circuit’s opinion purported to separate discrimination
based on gender stereotypes from that based on homosexuality.
After surveying Prowel’s “demeanor and appearance,” the court
immediately noted that “Prowel also testified that he is a
homosexual”—as if this might surprise readers who have just been
told of Prowel’s grooming habits and “pizzazz,” not to mention the
rainbow decal on his car.95 The opinion then went on to relate the
incident in 1997 when Prowel was “outed”—even the court put this in
scare quotes—and described how “[a]fter Prowel was outed, some of
his co-workers began causing problems for him, subjecting him to
verbal and written attacks.”96
The distinction the court tried to draw, however, between the
demeanor- and appearance-based stereotyping that preceded
Prowel’s “outing” and the sexuality-based discrimination that
followed it remains utterly unconvincing. Ordinarily, to “out”
someone is to publicize previously unknown information about that
person’s sexuality. The court claimed that Prowel was outed when
someone posted a gay personal ad at his workstation.97 But here, the
court failed to note how the prank in question could have revealed
anything about Prowel’s sexuality. The man appearing in the
classified ad, after all, was not Prowel. If the same ad had been
placed on the desk of another worker—one who trimmed his nails
with a utility knife and operated machinery without “pizzazz”—it
seems unlikely that coworkers would have suddenly suspected his
sexuality. The so-called “outing” of Prowel only had meaning in a
context where Prowel’s colleagues had already formed beliefs about
his sexuality built upon gender stereotypes; it is implausible that the
personal ad incident added to or altered those beliefs.

cannot provide specific evidence of discrimination occurring for reasons entirely
distinct from an unprotected status.”).
95. See Prowel, 579 F.3d at 287.
96. Id.
97. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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This conclusion is bolstered by another omission in the court’s
opinion: the unanswered question of why Prowel was targeted for
“outing” in the first place. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the
person who left the newspaper clipping had any privileged
knowledge about Prowel or his sexuality. So why was the same-sex
personal ad placed at Prowel’s workstation rather than at somebody
else’s? Again, the only explanation to emerge from the opinion is
that Prowel’s appearance and affect, his visible violation of gender
stereotypes, prompted the harassment. Presumably, the anonymous
“outer” targeted Prowel for the same reason that coworkers viewed
that act as an “outing”: because Prowel’s failure to conform to
gender stereotypes had already spawned beliefs about his sexuality.
The so-called outing was really not an outing at all; it was simply
another manifestation of his ongoing gender-based harassment. As
described by the Third Circuit, the act seems to have reflected
coworkers’ existing beliefs more than it formed new ones.98 In
Prowel’s case, so-called sexuality discrimination reduced entirely to
harassment based on gender nonconformity.99
Looking in reverse, a second point underscores not how gender
stereotyping led to Prowel’s outing, but instead what his outing reveals
about the content of those gender stereotypes. Prowel’s demeanor
and appearance, like his grooming, conversation topics, and “pizzazz,”
all must have been perceived by coworkers as “gay” traits.100 The court
itself confirmed this in a revealing slip. As it described Prowel’s various
violations of gender stereotypes, the court added that he “had a
rainbow decal on the trunk of his car.”101 Rainbow insignia are, of
course, symbols of gay pride.102 That the court found nothing strange
about including the decal in its list of details about the way Prowel
walked and talked and dressed suggests that it also must have seen the
latter traits as indicators of his sexual orientation.
98. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292.
99. Cf. Valdes, supra note 45, at 16 (“[T]here is no such thing as discrimination
‘based’ solely or exclusively on sexual orientation. On the contrary, . . . discrimination
deemed based on sexual orientation also and necessarily is based on sex or on gender
(or on both).” (footnote omitted)).
100. See generally id. at 14–15 (describing the conflation of gender and sexual
orientation); Yoshino, supra note 13, at 844 (“Whatever the source, there is clearly an
enduring conventional wisdom that gender atypicality is a marker for
homosexuality.”).
101. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 287.
102. See The Gay Rainbow Flag, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ahistoryoftheworld
/objects/BGqvwCIMQTOJyteHo_c6dw (last visited Feb. 9, 2014); Forrest Wickman,
A Rainbow Marriage: How Did the Rainbow Become a Symbol of Gay Pride?, SLATE (June
26, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/explainer/2012/06/rainbows
_and_gay_pride_how_the_rainbow_became_a_symbol_of_the_glbt_movement_.html.
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Further, the traits on the Third Circuit’s list, while all instances of
gender nonconformity,103 are decidedly not all feminine. To be sure,
some are. Prowel’s high voice, his “effeminate” walk,104 his nail filing,
and his tendency to cross his legs “the way a woman would sit” all
reflect stereotypically female traits.105 But discussing “art, music,
interior design, and decor”; not cursing; keeping a clean car; and
appearing well-groomed106 all depart from masculine stereotypes
without thereby becoming stereotypically feminine. The Third
Circuit’s most vivid descriptor, the “pizzazz” with which Prowel
operated his nale encoder,107 has a similar connotation. It suggests
insufficient masculinity, but not necessarily effeminacy—unless
“effeminate” is being used as a synonym for “unmanly.” To say that a
man does something with “pizzazz” is not to say that he does it like a
woman. It is to say he acts in a stereotypically gay manner. If Prowel
“did not conform to Wise’s vision of how a man should look, speak,
and act,”108 this was not (or not entirely) because he looked or acted
like a woman. Rather, his gender nonconformity consisted largely of
looking or acting in ways seen as gay.
This is perceived
homosexuality in its literal, sensory form.
A court might attempt to separate gender nonconforming traits that
suggest sexual orientation from those associated with the opposite
sex. In other words, the Prowel court might have made its mixedmotive analysis more fine-grained: rather than attempting to
separate gender stereotyping from sexual orientation claims, it could
have tried to divide stereotyping that was gender-based from
stereotyping based on traits coded as homosexual. On remand,
Prowel would have been able to rely only on harassment targeting his
high voice and other effeminate traits; his “pizzazz” and grooming
habits would be irrelevant since they are not stereotypically associated
with the opposite gender.
Notably, however, in the five years of federal gender stereotyping
cases examined in Part III, courts hardly ever tried to make this sort
of distinction. Only two cases do so explicitly. In one, Anderson v.
103. See Prowel, 579 F.3d at 291 (“The record demonstrates that Prowel has
adduced evidence of harassment based on gender stereotypes.”); see also id. at 291–92
(listing the violated stereotypes).
104. Id. at 291. Given the ambiguity, described below, in the way “effeminacy” is
used both to indicate something feminine and as something insufficiently masculine,
it may be that Prowel walked not like a stereotypical woman, but rather like
stereotypical gay man.
105. See id. (contrasting these traits with the traits of “the typical male at Wise”).
106. Id. at 287, 291.
107. Id. at 287.
108. Id. at 292.
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Napolitano,109 the gay plaintiff had caught his coworkers making fun
of him by “lisping and talking in a stereotypically flamboyant voice.”110
Noting that nothing in the record suggested that the plaintiff actually
lisped, the court went on to decide that even if he did, and even if his
coworkers were imitating him, “the logical conclusion is that his
coworkers were lisping because of the stereotype that gay men speak
with a lisp.”111 The court reasoned that “[l]isping is not a stereotype
associated with women.”112 The second case is somewhat different, in
that it involved a straight female plaintiff harassed by her allegedly
lesbian coworker. In Love v. Motiva Enterprises, LLC,113 the plaintiff
claimed that she did not “conform to [her boss’s] idea of a liberated,
physically fit woman.”114 The court faulted her, however, for making
no allegation that her boss “harassed her for having male traits or
mannerisms.”115 It explained: “[A]ll the circuit cases recognizing
same-sex sexual stereotyping claims have involved harassment of men
for having feminine traits or mannerisms, or women for having male
traits or mannerisms.”116 As Prowel shows, this claim is incorrect; a
man can fail to conform to masculine norms in any number of ways
that do not count as feminine.
Insofar as Anderson and Love explicitly equate gender
nonconformity with conformity to stereotypes about the opposite
gender, these cases are outliers. Far more commonly, courts first
define gender stereotyping broadly to encompass all stereotypes
observable at work and then ask which came first, the gender
stereotyping or the beliefs about the plaintiff’s sexuality.
For example, in a somewhat obscure passage from Kalich v. AT&T
Mobility, LLC,117 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan stated:
An employee may maintain an action under Title VII for gender
stereotyping, that is, where employment decisions or workplace
harassment are based on the perception that the employee is not
masculine enough or feminine enough and he or she fails “to
conform to [gender] stereotypes.” But that is not exactly what the
plaintiff alleges here. Rather, the complaint and the discovery lay
109. No. 09-60744-CIV, 2010 WL 431898 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2010).
110. Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. No. 07-5970, 2008 WL 4286662 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2008), aff’d per curiam, 349
F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009).
114. Id. at *9.
115. Id. at *10.
116. Id.
117. 748 F. Supp. 2d 712 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 679 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2012).
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out a pattern of conduct by [the plaintiff’s supervisor] David Rich
that is designed to ridicule the plaintiff’s effeminate characteristics,
which Rich perceived to arise from his homosexuality.118

In Kalich, the harasser unquestionably viewed the plaintiff as
effeminate in the narrow sense of looking or acting stereotypically
feminine. The plaintiff’s supervisor called him women’s names and
told him “he looked like a girl.”119 Despite this, the plaintiff lost on
summary judgment because his effeminacy was “perceived to arise
from his homosexuality.”120
According to Kalich’s logic, being perceived as homosexual must be
somehow separable from being seen or heard to exhibit certain gaycoded traits. Whereas in Prowel, awareness of Brian Prowel’s sexuality
arose from sensory perceptions of his “unmasculine” behavior and
appearance, in Kalich “the plaintiff’s effeminate characteristics . . .
[were] perceived to arise from his homosexuality.”121
In Kalich, “perceived” seems to refer to something other than that
which is seen or heard. An explanation of this cognitive, as opposed
to sensory, way of perceiving homosexuality emerges from the case
the Kalich court itself cites: Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center.122
B. Cognitive Perception: Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center
Christopher Vickers worked as a police officer at the Fairfield
Medical Center in Lancaster, Ohio.123 According to the complaint
Vickers filed in 2003, two fellow policemen began harassing him after
they learned that he had befriended a gay male medic in the course
of an investigation.124 Harassment increased after the coworkers
discovered that Vickers had taken a vacation to Florida with another
man.125 Despite the rumors spread by his colleagues, Vickers, both at
work and in the subsequent litigation, “declined to reveal whether or
not he is, in fact, homosexual.”126

118. Id. at 718 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 715.
120. Id. at 714, 718.
121. Id. at 718.
122. 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006).
123. Id. at 759.
124. Complaint ¶ 15, Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-858, 2003 WL
23736044 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2003). The facts described here are those alleged in
Vickers’s Complaint. Since, however, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment on the pleadings, it necessarily accepted Vickers’s factual allegations as
true. See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759, 761.
125. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759.
126. Id. at 764.
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Vickers’s harassment took a variety of forms. Coworkers sabotaged
his firearm and handcuffs;127 sprayed a topical anesthetic on his
drinking cup and a chemical irritant on his jacket;128 rubbed a
sanitary napkin on his face and taped it to his coat;129 impressed the
word “FAG” on official forms so that it would appear on the carbon
duplicates;130 accused him of going to gay bath houses;131 implied that
he had sex with a seventeen-year-old male employee;132 and
pretended to have sex with a Barney doll before shoving the doll in
Vickers’s crotch.133 Once, after handcuffing Vickers during a training
exercise, a coworker simulated anal sex while their boss took pictures,
which were later faxed to the Fairfield Medical Center’s registration
desk.134 Throughout this period, coworkers referred to Vickers as a
“faggot”;135 attached a rainbow sticker to his mailbox;136 and made
jokes about Vickers having “titties,”137 a heavy menstrual flow,138 and
undescended testicles.139
In what the district court described as “artful pleading,” Vickers
claimed that “his harassment stem[med] not from his real or
perceived homosexuality but from ‘real or perceived nonconformity
with gender norms.’”140 His complaint equated, or conflated,
allegations of homosexuality with questions about Vickers’s
masculinity.141 More pointedly, it characterized the defendants as
having made “snide comments suggesting that Vickers regularly
engaged in non-stereotypical behavior for men, such as having sex with
men rather than women.”142
Recognizing the Title VII dilemma before it, the Sixth Circuit
contended that Vickers’s stereotyping charge was merely a sexual

127. See Complaint, supra note 124, ¶¶ 21–24.
128. Id. ¶ 110.
129. Id. ¶ 72.
130. Id. ¶ 25.
131. Id. ¶¶ 86, 90, 112.
132. Id. ¶ 20.
133. Id. ¶¶ 91–92.
134. Id. ¶¶ 33–37.
135. Id. ¶¶ 56, 61, 106.
136. Id. ¶ 47.
137. Id. ¶ 67.
138. Id. ¶ 71.
139. Id. ¶ 74.
140. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., No. 2:03-CV-858, 2006 WL 5549247, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio July 19, 2006) (quoting Complaint, supra note 124, ¶ 250), aff’d, 453 F.3d 757
(6th Cir. 2006)).
141. See Complaint, supra note 124, ¶ 16 (“Dixon and Mueller began making
sexually based slurs and discriminating remarks and comments about Vickers,
alleging that Vickers was ‘gay’ or homosexual, and questioning his masculinity.”).
142. Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis added).
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orientation claim under another name.143 “[A]ny discrimination
based on sexual orientation would be actionable under a sex
stereotyping theory if [Vickers’s] claim [were] allowed to stand,” the
court claimed, “as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to
traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.”144
Challenged with figuring out how Vickers’s claim could not be
“allowed to stand” given Price Waterhouse, a divided panel began by
subtly re-characterizing his actual claim.145
Rephrased by the
majority, Vickers’s allegation was that, “in the eyes of his co-workers,
his sexual practices, whether real or perceived, did not conform to
the traditionally masculine role.”146 Instead, the court continued, “in
his supposed sexual practices, he behaved more like a woman.”147
This characterization of Vickers’s claim already contains the
ambiguity that festers into the majority’s holding. The coworkers’
referenced “eyes” are metaphorical, no more tied to literal visibility
than Vickers’s perceived, or falsely imputed, sexual orientation. “In
the eyes of his co-workers” surely means “in the minds of his
coworkers”; Vickers’s claim was that coworkers thought him to be gay.
Yet two sentences later, the court began treating visibility as
something more than mere metaphor. The court claimed that “[t]he
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse focused principally on
characteristics that were readily demonstrable in the workplace.”148
Later cases, the Sixth Circuit noted, limited Price Waterhouse to
instances “where gender non-conformance is demonstrable through
the plaintiff’s appearance or behavior.”149 In support of this, the
court cited a 2005 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, adding its own emphasis to that case’s holding: “an
individual may have a viable Title VII discrimination claim where the
143. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763; see also supra Part I (describing the dilemma).
144. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 764.
145. See id. (asserting that Vickers’s claim attempts to “bootstrap protection for
sexual orientation into Title VII” (quoting Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d
211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005))).
146. Id.
147. Id. The court hedged on how exactly Vickers violated gender stereotypes.
Despite its language that “all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to
traditional gender norms in their sexual practices,” id. at 764, the court also
mentioned that “Vickers . . . was only teased about giving, not receiving fellatio, and
about receiving anal sex,” id. at 763 n.2. The intriguing suggestion here is that
Vickers might have run afoul of masculine stereotypes, not just by being perceived as
gay, but also by being perceived as the non-dominant partner in his sexual
relationships. The Vickers court thus considered, but rejected, the distinction
between passive and active sexual partners that Ian Ayres and Richard Luedeman
have recently suggested as a potential way out of the Title VII dilemma. See Ayres &
Luedeman, supra note 25, at 716–18 & nn.2–5.
148. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763.
149. Id.
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employer acted out of animus toward his or her ‘exhibition of behavior
considered to be stereotypically inappropriate for their gender.’”150
In quick succession, then, the court limited stereotypes first, to those
readily demonstrable in the workplace, then to those demonstrable
through appearance or behavior, and finally to those demonstrable
through behavior that is exhibited. Once behavior was reduced to that
which is exhibited at work, it too, no less than a worker’s appearance,
became limited to that which is seen in the workplace.
With the spectrum of gender stereotyping so limited, Vickers was
bound to lose, since neither his appearance nor the behavior he
exhibited at work violated gender stereotypes. In the words of the
Sixth Circuit:
[T]he gender non-conforming behavior which Vickers claims
supports his theory of sex stereotyping is not behavior observed at
work or affecting his job performance. Vickers has made no
argument that his appearance or mannerisms on the job were
perceived as gender non-conforming in some way and provided the
basis for the harassment he experienced. Rather, the harassment
of which Vickers complains is more properly viewed as harassment
based on Vickers’ perceived homosexuality, rather than based on
gender nonconformity.151

Underscoring the ambiguous language of visuality in this passage
emphasizes just how much work the ambiguity does. What the court
required were appearances literally “perceived” or “observed at
work.” Yet Vickers’s “perceived homosexuality” was something
different; since the latter was something known rather than seen, the
court was able to “view” it, which is to say, think of it, as something
separate and unprotected. The court concluded that Vickers’s claim
failed not because he had been “classified . . . as a homosexual,” but
because he “failed to allege that he did not conform to traditional
gender stereotypes in any observable way at work. Thus, he [did] not
allege a claim of sex stereotyping.”152
It is worth pausing to notice the crucial non-sequitur in the passage
just quoted. The second sentence drops the qualification of the
preceding sentence, which talked of observable non-conformance with
gender stereotypes. With this omission, “sex stereotyping” claims are
defined as—and limited to—claims regarding stereotypes violated in
an “observable way at work.” Instead of remaining a subset of

150. Id. (emphasis added by Vickers court) (quoting Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218).
Dawson is discussed infra Part III.
151. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
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stereotyping claims, claims based on observable violations end up
swallowing the whole. Observability thereby becomes, in Vickers, a
necessary element of sex stereotyping.
In sum, the Vickers court was faced with a set of mutually
inconsistent propositions: (1) Price Waterhouse holds that Title VII
protects against the entire spectrum of gender stereotypes; (2) beliefs
that men should be attracted to women (and vice versa) count as
gender stereotypes; and (3) Title VII does not extend to claims based
on sexual orientation. The court rescued itself from this dilemma by
redefining Price Waterhouse’s definition of gender stereotypes to
include only stereotypes concerning appearances or behavior
observable in the workplace.153
Thus, when Vickers alleged discrimination based on “perceived
nonconformity with gender norms,”154 it turns out that he was using
“perceived” in the wrong sense. Vickers’s nonconformity was
something his coworkers believed; the Sixth Circuit demanded
instead that it be something seen.155 As the dissenter on the panel
wrote, the majority required “an outward workplace manifestation of
less-than-masculine gender characteristics.”156
Two points are worth emphasizing here. First, the distinction
between sensory and cognitive perception should not be overstated.
Not only are sense perceptions the source of much of our knowledge,
but sense perceptions are themselves mental processes.157 As applied
here, coworkers might come to understand that a colleague is gay
based on something they see or hear, such as a photo on someone’s
desk or an overhead phone conversation. These would still count as
cognitive perception cases, akin to Vickers, for the purposes of this
Article. After all, even in Vickers, officers must have seen Vickers with
the gay medic or heard about his trip to Florida. The point is that
coworkers harassed Vickers because they came to know or suspect
something about his affective preferences and sexual activity, neither
of which were observable at work. Contrast this with Prowel, in which
colleagues literally saw the violations of gender norms described by the
Third Circuit. In short, the distinction between cases like Prowel and
153. See id. at 763.
154. Complaint, supra note 124, ¶ 250.
155. See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763.
156. Id. at 767 (Lawson, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that Vickers had made
sufficient allegations about gender nonconformity to survive a motion to dismiss on
the pleadings. Id. at 768. Even so, the dissent’s description of gender nonconformity
as “less-than-masculine” troublingly suggests a stereotype of its own: masculinity is
greater than, not just different from, characteristics not coded as masculine.
157. See generally Stanley Coren, Sensation and Perception, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGY 100, 100–27 (Donald K. Freedheim & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 2013).

SOUCEK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/2/2014 2:43 PM

PERCEIVED HOMOSEXUALS

743

those like Vickers turns on whether someone saw or heard, or merely
heard about, the plaintiff’s nonconformity with sex stereotypes.
Second, Vickers’s limitation of Price Waterhouse stereotyping claims to
appearances and behavior observable at work is not the rule
elsewhere in Title VII case law.158 The Vickers court derived this
limitation from a 2005 Second Circuit case, Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble,159 in which the court claimed that “[g]enerally speaking, one
can fail to conform to gender stereotypes in two ways: (1) through
behavior or (2) through appearance.”160 But even the Second Circuit
in Dawson discussed at length an earlier application of gender
stereotyping theory to mothers of young children in Back v. Hastings
on Hudson Union Free School District.161 Back involved a school
psychologist with small children at home.162 Back’s supervisors
alleged that her good performance at work was “just an ‘act’ until
[she] got tenure,” after which, they believed, she would spend more
time at home.163 Echoing Price Waterhouse, the Second Circuit
determined:
it takes no special training to discern stereotyping in the view that a
woman cannot “be a good mother” and have a job that requires
long hours, or in the statement that a mother who received tenure
“would not show the same level of commitment [she] had shown
because [she] had little ones at home.”164

Importantly, these are cognitive stereotypes about mothers. The fact
that Back’s supervisors thought she was putting on “an act”165 proves
that their stereotypes did not derive from her behavior or appearance
at work, as the Dawson and Vickers courts require. As the next Part
demonstrates, cognitive stereotypes about mothers have been
recognized repeatedly in the federal courts. This makes all the more
anomalous the holding in Vickers and Dawson that an employee’s
158. See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for
Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 111 (2002) (“The bar on enforcing sex- or racebased stereotypes applies regardless of whether the stereotype concerns behavior in
or out of the workplace.”).
159. 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005); see Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763–64 (citing Dawson as
“instructive” and stating that even though Vickers’s sexuality was unknown, his claim
was “precisely the kind of bootstrapping that the Dawson court warned against”).
160. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 221.
161. 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004). The Dawson court ultimately distinguished Back
on the basis that Dawson presented no triable issues of fact that her supervisors were
concerned with gender nonconformity, or for that matter, sexuality. See Dawson, 398
F.3d at 221–23. It is notable in this regard that Dawson also lost her sexual
orientation discrimination claims under state and local laws. See id. at 219, 221.
162. Back, 365 F.3d at 115.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 120 (alterations in original).
165. Id. at 115.
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nonconformity with gender stereotypes must be observed at work, not
‘merely’ cognized. Yet this is the requirement that these cases
establish for cases brought by gay, or allegedly gay, plaintiffs.
The Second Circuit has complained that, “[w]hen utilized by an
avowedly homosexual plaintiff, . . . gender stereotyping claims can
easily present problems for an adjudicator.”166 Vickers and Prowel
together suggest how courts have tried to address those problems.
Expanding the inquiry’s scope, the next Part shows that their
proposed solutions are by no means unique.
III. FIVE YEARS OF FEDERAL STEREOTYPING CASES
A. Cases and Method
This Article focuses on 117 federal gender stereotyping cases from
a period from 1992 to 2013. These cases were found by, first,
conducting a search of all of the gender stereotyping cases heard in
the federal courts over a five-year period. A search for opinions that
mentioned “Title VII” along with a phrase such as “gender
stereotyping,” “sex stereotyping,” “gender nonconformity” or cognate
terms,167 turned up 204 cases, from which 110 opinions that either
were not on topic or had been superseded by a subsequent appellate
opinion were removed. Since courts generally look to Title VII
precedent when analyzing discrimination “on the basis of sex” under
Title IX,168 cases were included in which plaintiffs brought gender
stereotyping claims under Title IX instead of, or in addition to, Title

166. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218. One district court recently, and unfortunately,
transformed these “problems for an adjudicator” into a challenge facing litigants. See
Maroney v. Waterbury Hosp., No. 3:10-CV-1415 (JCH), 2011 WL 1085633, at *2 n.2
(D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2011) (“The Second Circuit has suggested that these gender
stereotyping claims may be especially difficult for gay plaintiffs to bring.” (citing
Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218)).
167. The set of cases was found using the following search string on Westlaw’s “All
Federal Cases” database: “title vii” & (“sex! stereo!” “gender stereo!” “gender
noncon!”). The date range searched was April 1, 2006, to March 31, 2011. These
dates were chosen based on when work on this Article began, not because they have
any significance in themselves.
168. Nelson v. Christian Bros. Univ., 226 F. App’x 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“Generally, courts have looked to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, as an analog for the
legal standards in both Title IX discrimination and retaliation claims.” (citing cases
from five circuits)). Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92318, tit. IX, §§ 901–907, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681–1688 (2012)), prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex” in “any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a).

SOUCEK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

PERCEIVED HOMOSEXUALS

4/2/2014 2:43 PM

745

VII.169 Decisions were removed, however, if they failed to address the
merits of the gender stereotyping claim at issue, focusing instead on
matters such as class certification.170
While cases such as Prowel and Vickers came up in this initial search,
leading cases from other circuits predated the search range. In order
to ensure that the most important cases involving sexuality and
gender stereotyping were included, an additional search was
conducted for federal appellate opinions from any year that
mentioned the previous search terms plus the terms “gay,”
“homosexual,” “homosexuality,” or “sexual orientation.” This yielded
an additional thirty-nine opinions, twenty-three of which addressed
the merits of a plaintiff’s gender stereotyping claim. These twentythree appellate cases, dating from 1992 to the present,171 together
with the 94 cases decided between 2006 and 2011, yielded the 117
cases studied.
As described below, each of these cases was
categorized by circuit, as a win or loss for the plaintiff, by type of
plaintiff, and by type of stereotype, whether perceptible or cognized.
The set includes cases arising out of every circuit except for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.172 Very few cases,
district or appellate, arise out of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, the Fourth Circuit, or the Eleventh Circuit.
Only two opinions come from the Fourth Circuit (with no district
opinions from that circuit), and neither involves issues of sexuality.173
No opinion in the set comes from the D.C. Circuit, and the only
opinion from the Eleventh Circuit involved a transgender, rather

169. An additional search for the same five years’ worth of gender or sex
stereotyping opinions that mentioned Title IX but not Title VII did not yield any
additional relevant cases.
170. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). Another important category of cases that were
excluded pertained to same-sex harassment that did not involve gender stereotyping.
Following Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), plaintiffs in
these cases generally have to show that their harasser was motivated either by sexual
desire or by hostility to the people of their gender in the workplace. The former
route obviously brings up questions about homosexuality, which is why a good
number of these cases showed up in this search. But, significantly, it is the harasser’s
sexuality, not the plaintiff’s that is implicated. These post-Oncale cases are thus not
among the perceived homosexual cases discussed below.
171. The oldest case in the set is Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th
Cir. Jan. 15, 1992). The most recent is EEOC v. Boh Bros. Construction Co., 731 F.3d
444 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
172. There are no Supreme Court cases in the set.
173. See generally Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289 (4th
Cir. 2010) (involving stereotypes about female truckers); Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478
F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 2007) (involving stereotypes about wives and mothers).

SOUCEK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 2:43 PM

746

[Vol. 63:715

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

than gay, plaintiff.174 Yet every other circuit—the First through Third
and Fifth though Tenth—has at least one appellate opinion involving
both gender stereotyping and sexuality.
Every opinion in the set was characterized as either a win or a loss
for the plaintiff. Since most of the decisions involved motions for
dismissal or summary judgment, opinions marked as “wins” do not
necessarily signal an ultimate victory in the case. A “win” in this
context often simply means that the plaintiff was allowed to proceed
further; the judge refused to dismiss the case or grant the defendant
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.
When considering the different kinds of plaintiffs involved, the cases
divide into three main types: (1) those brought by homosexuals,
whether actual or perceived;175 (2) those in which the sexuality of the
plaintiff was not discussed (presumably because the plaintiff was an
actual or perceived hetereosexual);176 and (3) cases involving
transgender plaintiffs.177 While cases brought by transgender plaintiffs
are easy to distinguish from the first two subsets of cases, the
distinction between subsets one and two is not always as obvious.
Plaintiffs who are gay, or are thought to be gay, do not always
disclose their sexuality.178 Nor do courts. The subset of cases
involving perceived homosexuality has been interpreted broadly to
174. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2011); see also infra
note 177 and accompanying text.
175. See infra Part III.B.
176. See infra Part III.C.
177. See, e.g., Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1313–14, 1321 (accepting a claim bought by a
transgender plaintiff who was fired because her supervisor believed that her gender
transition would be “inappropriate” and “disruptive” and would make fellow
employees “uncomfortable”); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218, 1224
(10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a discrimination claim brought by a transgender plaintiff
whose employer worried about her bathroom usage); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 293, 300, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) (accepting a claim brought by a transgender
plaintiff whose supervisor recoiled when shown a picture of what the employee
would look like after transitioning).
In order to avoid conflating the discrimination faced by gay and transgender
employees, I have put aside the third subset of cases—those brought by transgender
plaintiffs—in order to discuss them more thoroughly in future work. However, it is
worth noting that, surprisingly, the trend in transgender cases echoes the findings
described below in the perceived homosexuality cases. See infra Part III.B. In short,
transgender plaintiffs tend to win if their discrimination stems from repulsion at
their appearance; they lose if their case turns on something thought about (often
obsessively) but not seen—namely, a penis in the women’s bathroom. Compare
Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 300, with Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1225.
178. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006)
(indicating that “Vickers has declined to reveal whether or not he is, in fact,
homosexual”); cf. Bovalino, supra note 8, at 1134 (“[G]ay plaintiffs bringing claims
under Title VII should emphasize the gender stereotyping theory and de-emphasize
any connection the discrimination has to homosexuality.” (quoted disapprovingly in
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005))).
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include those where the plaintiff’s sexuality was discussed in coded
rather than explicit terms. The paradigmatic example of such a case
is Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C.,179 in which an employer
described the female plaintiff as having “an Ellen DeGeneres kind of
look.”180 It would seem obvious that this means she looked like (one
stereotype of) a lesbian. Also included in this first subset are cases in
which sexuality emerges more from the content of the alleged
harassment than from any stated beliefs or revelations about the
plaintiff. Gay-tinged slurs are, of course, not always indicative of some
belief about the sexuality of their target.181 Often they are merely allpurpose insults, blunt indications of dislike. However, cases involving
gay slurs were included within the first subset if they led the court to
grapple with issues of sexual orientation under Title VII.
The remaining, second subset of opinions come closest to the Price
Waterhouse model:
these are the cases in which the gender
stereotyping at issue does not raise or suggest questions about
homosexuality.182 These include a number of cases like Back, in
which stereotypes about parents, normally mothers, lead to adverse
employment actions.183
Finally, all 117 of the gender stereotyping cases in the set were
categorized as involving either perceptible or cognized violations of
gender norms. This reflects the difference already described
between the stereotyping of Prowel and that of Vickers.184 Cases were
coded as perceptible stereotyping cases if they involve stereotypes
about how the plaintiff appeared or behaved at work. Cognitive
cases, by contrast, involve stereotypes related to knowledge or beliefs
about the plaintiff.

179. 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010).
180. Id. at 1036.
181. See, e.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 458 (5th Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (indicating that the harasser used anti-gay slurs because he considered the
plaintiff insufficiently “manly,” not because he thought the plaintiff was gay).
182. This is different, of course, from saying that the cases do not raise questions
about sexuality. In Willingham v. Regions Bank, No. 2:09-cv-02289, 2010 WL 2650727
(W.D. Tenn. July 1, 2010), for example, a private banker in Memphis was fired after
she appeared wearing a bikini in Cruzin’ South, a magazine devoted to motorcycles
and custom cars. Id. at *2. Though she claimed to have violated her employer’s
stereotypical view that women should be conservatively dressed, id. at *3, the plaintiff
also could be seen as flaunting her (hetero)sexuality. Significantly, the court relied
on Vickers in granting summary judgment to the employer, reasoning that the
plaintiff had not violated gender stereotypes at work. Id.
183. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text for discussion of Back v.
Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District, 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) and
cognitively perceived stereotypes concerning working mothers.
184. See supra Part II.A (Prowel); Part II.B. (Vickers).
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B. Cases Involving Perceived Homosexuality

Prowel and Vickers both involved perceived homosexuality, but
“perceived” had different meanings in the two cases.185 Prowel
looked gay, at least in the eyes of his coworkers and, it seems, the
Third Circuit.186 Vickers was thought to be gay.187 The fact that
Prowel won and Vickers lost is not unusual. Table 1 shows the sharp
discrepancy in outcomes between cases involving literally perceptible
and cognitively perceived stereotype violations in cases brought by
perceived homosexuals.
Table 1. Discrimination Cases Involving Perceived Homosexuality
Visible Stereotypes
Cognized Stereotypes

Plaintiff Wins Plaintiff Loses
12
3
1
35

1.

Visible stereotypes
A wide variety of appearances and behaviors seem to violate gender
stereotypes in American workplaces. Earrings and certain hairstyles
on men are predictable violations.188 Less expected, perhaps, is an
iron worker’s use of “Wet Ones” wipes rather than toilet paper on the
job site.189 A coworker thought that using those wipes was “kind of
gay,” “feminine,” or “homo.”190 In opinions involving sensibly
perceptible stereotypes, some plaintiffs’ ways of walking, talking, or
gesturing were explicitly compared to those of women.191 Others,
185. See supra Part II.A–B.
186. See Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2009); see also
supra notes 81–84 (describing the characteristics that presumably made Prowel
“look gay”).
187. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2006); see also supra
text accompanying notes 124–26 (indicating that coworkers believed that Vickers,
who never revealed his sexual orientation, was gay because he befriended another
gay man).
188. See Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 F. App’x 48, 50 (3d Cir. 2005)
(earring); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 567, 581 (7th Cir. 1997) (earring
and long hair), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV
08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 4948664, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (earring and
“effeminate” haircut). An earring-wearing male, fired by the Happy Times Nursery
School for his effeminacy, was among the losing plaintiffs in DeSantis v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., one of the best-known sexuality cases pre-dating Price
Waterhouse. See DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331–32 (9th Cir. 1979),
overruled by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
189. See EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
190. Id. at 450, 457–58.
191. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (noting that the plaintiff was mocked “because
he walked ‘like a woman’”); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d
135, 152 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing that the plaintiff was harassed because his
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however, were described not as feminine, but as insufficiently
“macho.”192 For example, colleagues of a municipal employee “made
fun of his appearance, mannerism, gestures, patterns of speech
and”—somewhat more strangely—“his seriousness” because “he did
not fit [Defendant’s] ‘macho’ image.”193 In another case, “a small,
non-muscular man with a disability” had a boss who thought he “was
not a ‘real man’ or a ‘manly man.’”194
The cases just described all involved male plaintiffs. In fact, of the
fifteen visible perception stereotyping cases in this subset, only three
were brought by women. Two were successful: a hotel front desk
worker who was fired because of her “Ellen DeGeneres kind of
look”195 and an eighth-grade student whose “gothic” dress and
friendship with a female classmate attracted harassment.196 The one
female plaintiff who lost presented an unusual case in which not she,
but her female harasser, was perceived to be gay.197 In a particularly
unsympathetic opinion, the court first denied the plaintiff’s Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.198 (same-sex harassment) claim in part
because she could not prove that her harasser was a lesbian, despite a
declaration that the harasser had said “men did not like her . . .
because she was gay or female.”199 The court treated this as logically

“expressive gestures and manner of speaking were of a nature stereotypically
associated with females”).
192. See, e.g., Schlegelmilch v. City of Sarasota Police Dep’t, No. 8:06CV139
T27MAP, 2006 WL 2246147, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that the
plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim for gender discrimination under
Title VII).
193. Id. (alteration in original).
194. Miller v. City of New York, 177 F. App’x 195, 196 (2d Cir. 2006).
195. See Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1035–36 (8th Cir.
2010) (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the hotel, which
instead sought a “Midwestern girl look”).
196. See Riccio v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 219, 221–22 (D. Conn.
2006) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment). Riccio, a Title IX
case, is a difficult opinion to unpack. The defendant claimed that the harassment
was based not on gender, but on personal animosity, sexuality, or plaintiff’s
“nonconforming type of dress,” id. at 225, as if the latter constituted something other
than gender nonconformity. The court, meanwhile, misread the holding of Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“We have never held that
workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically
discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations.”), and based its decision on the fact that some of the slurs used
(“dyke,” “lesbian,” etc.) were gender-specific. See Riccio, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
197. See Love v. Motiva Enters., LLC, No. 07-5970, 2008 WL 4286662, at *1 (E.D.
La. Sept. 17, 2008).
198. 523 U.S. 75 (1998); see supra notes 69, 170 (describing that under Oncale,
plaintiffs alleging same-sex harassment that did not involve gender stereotyping
must show that their harasser’s motivation was animosity to the plaintiff’s gender
or sexual desire).
199. See Love, 2008 WL 4286662 at *6–7 & n.17.
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disjunctive: it proved only that she was one or the other.200 The
plaintiff’s gender stereotyping claim—to which the court then
turned—was that she did not conform to her alleged harasser’s “idea
of a liberated, physically fit woman.”201 Noting, without deciding, that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit might not even
recognize gender stereotyping claims,202 the court distinguished
individuals’ idiosyncratic ideas about gender from “society’s general
ideas about traits commonly thought to be shared by persons of the
same physical type.”203 The court concluded that “[w]hatever [the
alleged harasser’s] individual ideas may have been about women’s
liberation and physical appearance, these do not constitute gender
stereotypes.”204 In marked contrast to the thoroughly idiosyncratic
stereotypes at issue in the Wet Ones case, the court in Love held that
individually held stereotypes are not cognizable under Title VII.205
In the other two perceptible stereotype cases in which plaintiffs
lost, courts used a somewhat different procedure: in both cases, the
courts seemingly weighed harassment based on perceptible
stereotypes against harassment based on knowledge or beliefs in
order to determine which did more explanatory work overall. The
court in EEOC v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.,206 which involved a retail
manager whose harassment drove a teenage employee to quit,207 was
especially explicit about this balancing process. On the one hand,
the court admitted that comments made about the plaintiff “arguably
implicate[d] gender stereotypes.”208 The store’s manager, Michael
Garrison had asked why the plaintiff, Kendrick Jones, “walk[ed] like
that,” called him “half-female,” and accused him of “using
tampons.”209 The plaintiff’s brief, meanwhile went still further:

200. Id. at *7 (“[T]he alleged statement by [the alleged harasser] indicates she was
unliked either because she was gay or because she was female, without confirming
whether either of these propositions is true.”).
201. Id. at *9.
202. Id. The Fifth Circuit has since decided this issue. See EEOC v. Boh Bros.
Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 456 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding that sexual
harassment claims, including those brought against a person of the same sex, can be
established using evidence of sex stereotyping).
203. Love, 2008 WL 4286662, at *10.
204. Id.
205. Compare Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 456–57 (focusing, in what the court describes as
an “intent-based inquiry,” on evidence of the harasser’s subjective view of the victim in
order to determine whether the harassment was “because of . . . sex”), with Love, 2008
WL 4286662, at *10 (distinguishing an individual’s biases from a societal stereotype).
206. No. 1:06-CV-2569-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2008).
207. Id. at *6.
208. Id. at *16.
209. Id. at *5, *8.
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In the warped mind of Garrison, Kendrick did not meet this [sic]
expectations of a stereotypical heterosexual male. A heterosexual
man should, in Garrison’s words, “get pussy.” A heterosexual male
should not walk the way Kendrick walked.
A masculine
heterosexual male should not be clean cut, shirt tucked-in, pants
creased and neat.210

All of these were ways in which, according to the plaintiff, his
supervisor had perceived him as “appearing gay or effeminate.”211
Once again, being seen as “clean cut” and “neat,” like being
perceived as “serious,”212 emerges as a way in which a man can violate
masculine stereotypes without thereby fitting feminine stereotypes.213
Despite these instances of gender stereotyping, the Family Dollar
court determined that “the record clearly reflects that the
harassment at issue was based primarily on Jones’s perceived sexual
orientation, rather than his gender or gender stereotypes.”214 After
considering the instances of harassment as a whole, the court
determined that “most” of the comments expressed a belief about
the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.215
In making this determination, the court explicitly followed Kay v.
Independence Blue Cross,216 the last of the three “losses” in the visible
stereotyping row of Table 1. In Kay, a divided panel217 of the Third
Circuit decided that references to the plaintiff’s sexual orientation
outnumbered insults about his not being a “real man.”218 The
appellate opinion failed to mention, as the court below had done,
that a coworker viewed the plaintiff as “a ‘miss prissy.’”219 Further, the
Third Circuit lumped together the slurs about sexuality with phrases
210. Id. at *9.
211. Id. at *8.
212. See supra text accompanying note 193 (describing a serious male plaintiff as
insufficiently macho); cf. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir.
2009) (“Prowel testified that he . . . was very well-groomed; wore what others would
consider dressy clothes; was neat; [and] filed his nails . . . .”).
213. The court in Love failed to recognize that possibility. See supra notes 113–16
and accompanying text (characterizing Love’s failure to allege sexual harassment
based on her male mannerisms as fatal to her claim).
214. Family Dollar, 2008 WL 4098723, at *17 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at *16.
216. 142 F. App’x 48 (3d Cir. 2005).
217. See id. at 51 (Rendell, J., concurring). Judge Rendell agreed with the district
court that gender stereotyping occurred. See id. (“The line between discrimination
based upon gender stereotyping and that based upon sexual orientation is difficult
to draw and in this case some of the complained of conduct arguably fits within both
rubrics.”). He would have resolved the case in favor of the defendant solely because
the harassment was not sufficiently pervasive or regular. See id.
218. Id. at 50 (majority opinion).
219. See Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, No. CIV. A. 02-3157, 2003 WL 21197289,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2003), aff’d, 142 F. App’x 48. The district court found “ample
evidence” of gender stereotyping. Id. at *5.
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such as “fem” and, even more bizarrely, “ass wipe.”220 While these
details may have affected the case’s outcome, so too did Kay’s failure
to emphasize his earring.221 Kay might have been more successful
had he explained what it was about his appearance or behavior that
caused his coworkers to say, just after his transfer to a new floor222:
“Did you see that fag that moved up on the floor yesterday?”223
Presumably, since the workers did not know him yet, they were
drawing their assumptions from his visible gender non-conformance.
The Kay court might also have left this question for trial. That was
the solution used in Prowel, where the Third Circuit, unlike the
district court it reversed,224 ignored its own earlier opinion in Kay.
Rather than attempting to weigh the visual versus cognized sources of
the anti-gay invective directed at the plaintiff, the Prowel court instead
treated this issue as a factual matter best left for a jury.225 This is the
approach also followed by the leading appellate cases from the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
In Doe v. City of Belleville,226 for example, the Seventh Circuit found
that a jury might “reasonably infer” gender-based harassment from
“the harassers’ evident belief that in wearing an earring, [the
plaintiff] did not conform to male standards.”227 Focusing on abusive

220. See Kay, 142 F. App’x at 51.
221. See id. at 50–51. In fact, Kay’s brief on appeal may have sabotaged his case by
distancing him more generally from certain forms of visible gender nonconformity.
The brief took pains to note that Kay “dresses very conservatively and wears his hair
short and in keeping with a professional businessperson. [He] has no unusual
walking style or gait and does not comport himself in a manner which would attract
negative attention to himself.” Brief for Appellant at 6, Kay, 142 F. App’x 48.
222. Brief for Appellant, supra note 221, at 8–9.
223. Kay, 142 F. App’x at 50.
224. See Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-259, 2007 WL 2702664, at *4
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2007), rev’d, 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009). Neither court was
bound by Kay, as Kay was issued as a non-precedential opinion. See 3d Cir. LAR
28.3(b) (2011).
225. See Prowel, 579 F.3d at 291.
226. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). Though Doe was
vacated in light of Oncale, courts in the Seventh Circuit consider themselves bound by
what one court characterized as Doe’s “second rationale, namely that ‘Title VII does
not permit an employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or
conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles.’” Jones v. Pac. Rail Servs.,
No. 00C 5776, 2001 WL 127645, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2001) (quoting Doe, 119 F.3d
at 580). The district court reasoned that nothing “in the Court’s decision to vacate
and remand Doe for reconsideration in light of Oncale . . . indicate[d] that the
Seventh Circuit’s second rationale [was] no longer viable.” Id.; see also Bibby v. Phila.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Absent an explicit
statement from the Supreme Court that it is turning its back on Price Waterhouse,
there is no reason to believe that the remand in City of Belleville was intended to call
its gender stereotypes holding into question.”).
227. Doe, 119 F.3d at 575; see also id. at 581 (“[A] man who is harassed because his
voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect
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questions about whether the plaintiff was “a boy or a girl,” the court
seemed unfazed by the far more frequent slurs that focused on the
plaintiff’s sexuality.228 Such evidence, the court held, “does not
establish, as a matter of law, that [the plaintiff] was being discriminated
against solely on the basis of his perceived sexual orientation, as
opposed to his sex.”229 The court offered two reasons for this holding:
First, sex or gender only needed to be a motivating factor in the
harassment, not the sole one.230 Second, and more relevant here,
homophobic and sex discrimination cannot be “rigidly
compartmentalize[d].”231 “[A] homophobic epithet,” the Seventh
Circuit held, “may be as much of a disparagement of a man’s perceived
effeminate qualities as it is of his perceived sexual orientation.”232
Importantly, nothing in Doe suggested that Doe’s harassers had any
knowledge about his sexual orientation. In fact, the Seventh Circuit
made a point of stating that the plaintiff was “not in fact gay.”233
Perhaps this explains the difference between Doe and Kay: what the
Doe court claimed cannot be compartmentalized is something
different from what the Kay court tried so hard to put into boxes. In
Kay, the court separated bias against the plaintiff’s appearance (which,
as in Doe, included an earring) from knowledge about his sexuality.234
In Doe, on the other hand, perceived effeminacy and perceived sexual
orientation both referred to something visual. As the Seventh Circuit
aptly summarized Doe in a subsequent case: “the harassers in Doe

he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how
men are to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his sex.”).
228. See id. at 567–68, 575–77 (focusing its analysis on gender discrimination,
while at the same time noting that he was frequently harassed due to his sexuality);
see also id. at 567 (“Dawe, a former Marine of imposing stature, constantly referred to
H. as ‘queer’ and ‘fag’ and urged H. to ‘go back to San Francisco with the rest of the
queers.’. . . Dawe soon took to calling H. his ‘bitch’ and said that he was going to
take him ‘out to the woods’ and ‘get [him] up the ass.’” (alteration in original)).
Though both H. and his twin brother J. were harassed, the Seventh Circuit noted
that H. was the main target of the abuse. See id. at 567.
229. Id. at 593. But see id. at 601 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that “it is not reasonable to infer” that the plaintiff was harassed
because he is “male and not female”).
230. Id. at 594. But see Stacks v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 (8th
Cir. 1994) (denying the possibility of a mixed-motive harassment claim, reasoning
that “[t]he analysis was designed for a challenge to ‘an adverse employment decision
in which both legitimate and illegitimate considerations played a part,’” and “[a]n
employer could never have a legitimate reason for creating a hostile work
environment.” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989)
(plurality opinion))). For a discussion of how courts have applied the mixed-motive
analysis in Title VII cases, see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
231. Doe, 119 F.3d at 593 n.27.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 592.
234. See supra notes 217–23.
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expressed and exhibited hostility to the way in which plaintiff H.
exhibited his sexuality.”235
Doe also raises a larger point: courts often cannot determine
whether harassment is “because of” an impermissible trait simply by
noting the form the harassment takes. Gay slurs are employed in
nearly all of the cases discussed in this section, winners and losers
both. Faced with slurs that mostly sound the same, courts are forced
to ask whether these slurs stem from knowledge about plaintiffs’
sexuality, or merely reflect antipathy towards the plaintiffs’
appearance or affect.
Compare, in this regard, an en banc case from the Ninth Circuit,
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.,236 in which the supervisor and
coworkers of an openly gay hotel butler blew kisses at him, called him
names, and touched him sexually “‘like they would to a woman.’”237
A concurring opinion and the dissent238 differed in their
interpretations of one key piece of testimony. When asked if one of
the harassers had teased him about the way he walked and had
whistled at him “like a woman,” the plaintiff responded: “Right. Like
a man does to a woman.”239
According to Judge Hug’s dissent, “the whistling was because
[Rene] was gay, not because of the way he walked.”240 However,
according to Judge Pregerson’s concurrence:
There would be no reason for Rene’s co-workers to whistle at Rene
“like a woman,” unless they perceived him to be not enough like a
man and too much like a woman. That is gender stereotyping, and
235. Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
236. 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
237. Id. at 1064 (plurality opinion) (quoting the plaintiff’s deposition testimony).
238. The plurality opinion, written by Judge Fletcher and joined by four others,
found that Rene had properly alleged harassment because of sex because the assaults
he described involved “areas of the body linked to sexuality.” Id. at 1066. The
dissent by Judge Hug, joined by three other judges, responded that treating all
harassment with sexual content as actionable ignores Title VII’s requirement that the
harassment occur “because of sex.” Id. at 1070, 1075, 1077 (Hug, J., dissenting). As
the Supreme Court noted in Oncale, “[w]e have never held that workplace
harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically
discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); see
also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1686–87
(1998) (“[M]uch of the gender-based hostility and abuse that women (and some
men) endure at work is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even
sexual in content.”).
239. Rene, 305 F.3d at 1077 n.4 (Hug, J., dissenting).
240. Id. Both the dissent and the concurrences agreed that same-sex gender
stereotyping would be proscribed by Title VII, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001). See
Rene, 305 F.3d at 1068 (Pregerson, J., concurring); id. at 1070 (Fisher, J.,
concurring); id. at 1077 (Hug, J., concurring).
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that is what Rene meant when he said he was discriminated against
because he was openly gay.241

The difference separating Judges Hug and Pregerson is that which
separates winning cases from losing ones. Importantly, both looked
at the same harassment: male workers whistling at a man as they
would to a woman. Yet Judge Hug’s dissent found this to be rooted
in the workers’ knowledge of the plaintiff’s sexuality.242 Judge
Pregerson’s concurrence instead began with what the workers saw; it
underscored the fact that the plaintiff’s sexuality was open,
presumably meaning visible.243 According to the concurrence, being
“openly gay” means being seen as “not enough like a man and too
much like a woman.”244
The dissenters in Rene instead proposed a general principle:
Discrimination in the form of harassment or assault on the job
because of a man’s activity outside the workplace, such as his sexual
activities, is not a basis for discrimination based on gender
stereotyping of how he is expected to work on the job. A person
might conform to all the stereotypes of masculinity on the job yet
have a homosexual orientation in his own private life.245

The dissenters’ proposed distinction is untenable. Rene’s sexual
orientation was not confined to “his own private life”; rather, his
sexuality was known at work, and that knowledge violated
“stereotypes of masculinity on the job.”246 The dissent’s outside-theworkplace/on-the-job distinction must be understood as the
cognitive/visual distinction discussed above.247 The stereotypes of
masculinity at issue in Rene were all present at the workplace; what
the dissent and the concurrence really disagreed about is whether
their violation was primarily known or seen.
2.

Cognized stereotypes
The dissent’s reading of the facts in Rene provides the model for
the thirty-six cases to be considered next: those involving cognized
stereotypes.
These are cases in which the plaintiff’s alleged
harassment or adverse employment action stemmed from someone’s
knowledge or beliefs about the plaintiff’s sexual orientation and,
possibly, his or her sexual activity or associations outside the
241. Rene, 305 F.3d at 1069 n.2 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 1077 n.4 (Hug, J., dissenting).
243. See id. at 1069 n.2 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1072 (Hug, J., dissenting).
246. See id.; see also id. at 1064 (plurality opinion) (indicating that Rene was
“openly gay”).
247. See supra Part II.
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workplace. Plaintiffs do not fare well in these cases. As shown in
Table 1, only one plaintiff won in a case of this sort; thirty-five lost.
Part II discussed Vickers as a paradigmatic example of a knowledgebased, rather than appearance-based, stereotyping case.248 In Vickers,
harassment of the plaintiff stemmed from his colleagues’ belief that
he was gay, a belief based on their knowledge that Vickers had
befriended a gay medic and then gone on vacation with another
man.249 Facts like these are not unique in the cases falling into this
group. In Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc.,250 for example, a
rumor had spread around the milk plant that the plaintiff, Hamm,
was involved in a romantic relationship with another coworker,
Zietlow.251 “Hamm’s coworkers thought it odd when Hamm gave
Zietlow a boat and let him use his four-wheel vehicle.”252 In Hamm as
in Vickers, knowledge about “suspicious” activity outside of work led to
slurs about the plaintiff’s sexuality.253 Hamm was no doubt speaking
of cognitive perception when, in his complaint, he bemoaned how
he’d grown “so sick of being threatened for what people perceive!”254
The court in Hamm relied on an earlier Seventh Circuit case,
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co.,255 which involved a more specific
knowledge claim. The harasser in that case “claimed that his brotherin-law and a coworker told him that they saw [the plaintiff] at gay
nightclubs.”256 The harasser in a 2009 district court case had still
more specific knowledge: the plaintiff had dated the harasser, his
coworker, for three months.257 Echoing the rainbow decal snuck into
248. Supra Part II.B.
249. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
250. 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003).
251. Id. at 1060.
252. Id.
253. Hamm likely undercut his cause by the complaints he filed with the
Wisconsin Equal Rights Division. As the Seventh Circuit wrote:
In his first complaint to the ERD, [Hamm] explained, “Dean Bohringer
believes that me and another individual are gay at work, he constantly refers
to me and Jeff Zietlow as faggots. Dean has threatened to kill me, snap my
neck for what he thinks to be true.” In a note written November 12, 1998,
and appended to his deposition, Hamm links judgment of his sexuality by his
peers to several of his allegations: “I am single so therefore it would more so
[be] believed that I was homosexual, I have had numerous people at the
plant pick on me on account of this . . . .”
Id. at 1063 (second alteration in original).
254. Id.
255. 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000).
256. Id. at 1083.
257. See Ayala-Sepulveda v. Mun. of San German, 661 F. Supp. 2d 130, 134, 137
(D.P.R. 2009) (finding that “the only allegation of sex stereotyping included in
plaintiff’s complaint is that the defendants acted upon their perception of Plaintiff as
a man who did not conform with the gender stereotypes associated with men in our
society” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Prowel’s list of gender non-conforming traits,258 the plaintiff in Kalich
v. AT&T Mobility, LLC had a blue and yellow bumper sticker from the
Human Rights Campaign, a gay-rights organization,259 on his car; his
supervisor would teasingly refer to the emblem as the Swedish flag.260
In Wilken v. Cascadia Behavioral Health Care, Inc,261 coworkers saw the
plaintiff kissing, hugging, and holding hands with her girlfriend, an
employee in a neighboring department.262 Though Wilken might
have provided the starkest possible example of literally perceived
homosexuality, the plaintiff did not bring a gender stereotyping
claim.263 She succeeded instead on a gender-association claim under
Oregon state law.264
Not all of the cases in the set reveal such clear sources of
knowledge or belief. A seminal opinion from the Second Circuit,
Simonton v. Runyon,265 stated simply: “Simonton’s sexual orientation
was known to his co-workers.”266 An early Sixth Circuit case left
matters even more mysterious. In Dillon v. Frank,267 the court wrote
that, after the plaintiff, Ernest Dillon, had worked as a mail handler
for four years, a coworker “began calling Dillon ‘fag,’ and saying that
‘Dillon sucks dicks.’”268 As with Kay,269 cases like Dillon raise questions
about what led coworkers to know or suspect the plaintiff’s sexuality.
One wonders, yet the record in these cases fails to answer, whether
they might have been tipped off by something gender nonconforming in the plaintiff’s appearance or affect.

258. See supra note 102 (indicating that rainbows symbolize gay pride).
259. See The HRC Story: About Our Logo, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org
/the-hrc-story/about-our-logo (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (describing its logo as “one of
the most recognizable symbols of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community”).
260. Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 748 F. Supp. 2d 712, 714–15 (E.D. Mich.
2010) (providing these remarks as the main support for its holding that the
supervisor’s “comments were targeted toward the plaintiff because [the supervisor]
perceived him to be a homosexual”), aff’d, 679 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2012).
261. No. CV 06-195-ST, 2007 WL 2916482 (D. Or. Oct. 5, 2007).
262. Id. at *5.
263. Id. at *20 n.13.
264. See id. at *22 & n.13 (holding that the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to
withstand summary judgment under OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030(1)(a)–(b), which was
amended after the alleged discrimination took place to explicitly list sexual orientation as
a protected ground).
265. 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000).
266. Id. at 35. In a similarly under-described set of facts, the plaintiff in Anderson
v. Napolitano, No. 09-60744-CIV, 2010 WL 431898 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2010) “alleg[ed]
that the Miami Field Office’s acting-Special Agent in Charge ‘learned of Anderson’s
sexual orientation a few days after Anderson reported for duty’ and ‘immediately
began to shun and isolated him within the office.’” Id. at *1.
267. No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
268. Id. at *1.
269. See supra notes 216–23 (offering conjectures as to what traits led to Kay’s
harassment).
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Plaintiffs’ failure to point to any specific gender non-conforming
traits leads to the downfall of many of the cases in the set.270 But,
importantly, plaintiffs also tend to lose if they add a stereotyping
claim after previously making a sexual orientation claim. Worried
about “bootstrapping,” courts appear wary of plaintiffs whose story
changes over time.271 Even a plaintiff who had been referred to “as
acting and dressing like ‘a girl,’ ‘a pussy’ and a ‘fag’” and had been
told “to ‘man up,’” failed in his gender stereotyping claim because he
had previously claimed, in a letter to his company’s CEO, that “he was

270. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 259, 264 (3d
Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment in the employer’s favor because the
plaintiff did not show that he was harassed because “he failed to comply with societal
stereotypes”); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 410, 413–14 (7th Cir. 1997)
(affirming summary judgment for the employer and distinguishing Doe on the
grounds that in that case, there was no evidence that the harassment came about
because of how the plaintiff “exhibited his sexuality”); Maroney v. Waterbury Hosp.,
No. 3:10-CV-1415 (JCH), 2011 WL 1085633, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2011)
(granting a motion to dismiss against a plaintiff who did not allege that he failed to
conform with accepted gender roles through his behavior or appearance); Lugo v.
Shinseki, No. 06 Civ. 13187(LAK)(GWG), 2010 WL 1993065, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May
19, 2010) (“[N]o . . . claim exists here because there is no evidence that [the
plaintiff] ‘behaved in a stereotypically feminine manner.’” (quoting Simonton, 232
F.3d at 38)); White v. Potter, No. 1:06-CV-1759-TWT, 2007 WL 1330378, at *17 n.22
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 2007) (“Plaintiff has not suggested that the gay remarks were
based on any sort of gender stereotypes. Instead he merely contends that he was
falsely accused of being gay.” (citation omitted)).
Other cases in this subset failed because the plaintiffs made purely conclusory
claims about gender stereotyping. See, e.g., Kiley v. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, 296 F. App’x 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying relief because the
plaintiff made “the conclusory statement that her supervisor made assumptions
about her informed by gender stereotypes of what women should look like and act”
without explicating how these assumptions “resulted in an adverse employment
decision”); Carter v. Town of Benson, 827 F. Supp. 2d, 700, 709–10 (W.D. La. June 7,
2010) (“[The plaintiff] has presented only a conclusory allegation and no evidence
of how she was perceived by Defendants as not conforming to stereotypical images
and expectations or how Defendants espoused stereotypical views.”).
Still other cases lacked sufficiently pervasive harassment or adverse employment
actions to succeed under Title VII. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d
211, 221–22 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that there was insufficient evidence that the
plaintiff’s lack of feminine clothing, jewelry, or body features led to adverse
employment decisions); Garside v. Hillside Family of Agencies, No. 09-CV-6181-CJS,
2011 WL 32582, at *1, *14 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2011) (contending that “one remark” is
insufficient to raise a triable harassment claim); Miller v. Kellogg USA, Inc., No.
8:04CV500, 2006 WL 1314330, at *2, *6–7 (D. Neb. May 11, 2006) (finding that the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the harassment was severe enough to substantiate
a prima facie hostile environment claim where a coworker “came from behind [the
plaintiff], grabbed his hips, and simulated having sex with him,” and where the
plaintiff saw graffiti and received anonymous notes referencing the incident, because
the plaintiff had described the incident as “definitely horseplay” and did not report
the graffiti or notes until he was fired).
271. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in
which courts denied relief to plaintiffs for trying to “bootstrap” sexual orientation
discrimination claims under Title VII).
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a victim of discrimination because he is [a] ‘gay man in a straight
man’s world.’”272
A better-known example comes from Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc.,273 the case that introduced the sexuality-as-stereotyping
theory into First Circuit case law. In Higgins, the court rejected the
plaintiff’s gender stereotyping claim because he had failed to raise it
in the court below.274 Nonetheless, in influential dicta, the court
noted for the first time in that circuit that “a man can ground a [Title
VII] claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him
because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity.”275
Higgins is exemplary in showing that a plaintiff’s loss can still provide
the rule under which future plaintiffs in that circuit might win. Simonton
plays the same role in the Second Circuit,276 just as Vickers does in the
Sixth. Meanwhile, leading cases from the Third,277 Seventh,278 Eighth,279
and Ninth280 Circuits all feature winning plaintiffs.
This leaves the Tenth Circuit. Its sexuality-as-stereotyping case,
Medina v. Income Support Division,281 involved stereotyping based on
knowledge rather than appearance and, unsurprisingly, a losing
plaintiff: Rebecca Medina, a straight woman who worked with a
number of lesbians at the Income Support Division (“ISD”) of New
Mexico.282 Medina claimed that her lesbian supervisor “harassed her
because of her failure to comport with gender stereotypes.”283 As the
Tenth Circuit explained, however, “there [was] no evidence—and no
claim—that Ms. Medina did not dress or behave like a stereotypical
woman.”284 Rather, the plaintiff “apparently argue[d] that she was
272. See Swift v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 483, 485, 488
(E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Turpin v. Good, No. 1:07-cv-1205-LJM-WGH, 2010 WL
2560421, at *3 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2010) (holding that the plaintiffs could not
“salvage” their claim by reframing it as one of gender stereotyping once they
discovered that Title IX does not cover sexual orientation claims).
273. 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999).
274. See id. at 260.
275. Id. at 261 n.4. As of February 11, 2014, Westlaw’s Headnote for this sentence
shows that it has been cited forty-five times.
276. See supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part II.A (discussing Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285
(3d Cir. 2009)).
278. See supra notes 226–35 and accompanying text (discussing Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998)).
279. See supra notes 179–80, 195 and accompanying text (discussing Lewis v.
Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010)).
280. See supra notes 32–33, 236–47 (discussing Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.,
305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), and Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc.,
256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001)).
281. 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005).
282. See id. at 1133–34.
283. Id. at 1135.
284. Id.
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punished for not acting like a stereotypical woman who worked at
ISD—which, according to her, [was] a lesbian.”285
Despite the opinion’s “opposite-day” quality—in which gender
nonconformity meant not looking like a lesbian—the ultimate point
was the same as in the other cases examined so far: success required
visible nonconformity with stereotypes regarding dress or behavior.
Lacking that, the Tenth Circuit’s resolution of the case was no
surprise. The court rejected Medina’s hostile work environment
claim, construing it to allege that “she was discriminated against
because she is a heterosexual,” and holding that “Title VII’s
protections . . . do not extend to harassment due to a person’s
sexuality.”286 The Tenth Circuit did not ask, and Medina did not
think to tell, how her colleagues came to know that she is
heterosexual. On the record before the court, it thus appeared that
Medina, like so many gay plaintiffs, had violated stereotypes at her
workplace in a purely cognitive rather than literally perceptible
manner. Her claim failed as a result.
C. Cases Not Involving Perceived Homosexuality
Among the 117 analyzed cases are forty-nine which do not raise
questions about the sexuality of the plaintiff. Though not themselves
the focus of this Article, they are important comparators to the cases
already discussed. Table 2 shows the outcomes in the subset of cases
not involving perceived homosexuality. Strikingly, the results are far
more equivocal than those reported in the previous Table.
Table 2. Discrimination Cases Not Involving Perceived Homosexuality
Plaintiff Wins Plaintiff Loses
Visible Stereotypes
11
8
Cognized Stereotypes
12
18
The first subcategory, the visible-stereotyping cases, includes Price
Waterhouse’s direct successors. The plaintiffs who successfully brought
these cases were women who were told to be more “sweet,”287 who

285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See Collins v. Cohen Pontani Lieberman & Pavane, No. 04 CV
8983(KMW)(MHD), 2008 WL 2971668, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008) (denying
summary judgment against the plaintiff where a law firm’s managing partner
advised the plaintiff that she “needed to use more ‘sugar’ with any paralegal who
was uncooperative”).
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were disliked for being “strong” or “aggressive,”288 or who were
suspected of managing “on emotions.”289 Analogously, a male
plaintiff, though in a Title IX case, successfully claimed to have been
stereotyped about being “not man enough” to stand up to the bullies
at school who had repeatedly assaulted him.290
Other cases in the visible-stereotype subcategory center more on
appearance than behavior.
These include two cases brought
unsuccessfully by men with long hair,291 and one brought successfully
by a woman harassed by female coworkers who called her “loose” and
made fun of the size of her breasts.292 Much better-known is Jespersen
v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,293 brought by Darlene Jespersen after she
was fired, having bartended at Harrah’s Casino in Reno for twenty
years, because she refused to comply with newly implemented
makeup requirements.294 In deposition testimony, Jespersen claimed
that wearing makeup “would conflict with her self-image,” undermine
her “credibility as an individual and as a person,” and hinder her
from doing her job.295
Split seven to four, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit held that
an employee’s personal objection to a makeup requirement cannot,

288. See Nuskey v. Hochberg, 657 F. Supp. 2d 47, 58 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding the
bank vice president’s alleged statements created a question of material fact
precluding summary judgment).
289. See Jankousky v. N. Fork Bancorporation, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1858(PAC), 2011
WL 1118602, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011) (holding that that a note in the
plaintiff’s file in which a bank’s district manager questioned whether the plaintiff
managed “on emotions,” coupled with testimony that another manager treated men
more favorably than women, created legitimate factual questions and thereby
precluded summary judgment).
290. See Doe v. Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822–23 (C.D. Ill. 2008)
(denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss).
291. See Milligan v. Bd. of Trs., No. 09-cv-320-JPG-CJP, 2010 WL 2649917, at *7,
*14 (S.D. Ill. June 30, 2010) (granting the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment where the plaintiff was told that “he would make a very sexy lady [and
that] he would look sexy as a girl,” finding that this evidenced a “failure to observe
personal boundaries,” not discrimination because of sex), aff’d, 686 F.3d 378 (7th
Cir. 2012); Dodd v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 06-4213, 2007 WL 1866754, at *1, *5–6
(E.D. Pa. June 28, 2007) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
claims of gender discrimination under Title VII where the plaintiff, a male
Rastafarian employee, was fired for wearing his hair in a ponytail, finding that
employers’ grooming policies generally do not constitute sex-based discrimination).
292. See Durkin v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 124, 135–36, 140–41
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim because a genuine issue of material fact
remained as to whether the plaintiff’s female coworkers, who harassed the plaintiff
regarding her breast size, did so “because of sex”).
293. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
294. Id. at 1106–08.
295. Id. at 1107–08.
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by itself, give rise to a sex stereotyping claim.296 Judge Pregerson,
joined by three others, dissented.297 “The inescapable message” of
Harrah’s makeup policy, Pregerson argued, “is that women’s
undoctored faces compare unfavorably to men’s, not because of a
physical difference between men’s and women’s faces, but because of
a cultural assumption—and gender-based stereotype—that women’s
faces are incomplete, unattractive, or unprofessional without full
makeup.”298 Jespersen is often cited as emblematic of courts’ refusal to
take appearance-based claims seriously, a topic discussed more fully
in the following Part.299 Here, I pause only to note one particularly
important point: Durkin v. Verizon, N.Y., Inc.300—the case, already
mentioned, in which the plaintiff was sexually harassed because of
her breast size301—is the only appearance-based case in the “straight
plaintiff” subset in which the plaintiff won. Like Jespersen, the
plaintiffs in every other case lost.
Plaintiffs bringing cognitive-stereotyping claims, the second subcategory of cases, are more successful. Forty percent of straight
cognitive-stereotyping plaintiffs won, compared to a three-percent
success rate for cognitively perceived homosexuals. These cognitivestereotyping cases divide into two main groups: (1) those in which
the employer harbors descriptive stereotypes about members of a
certain gender,302 and (2) those in which an employer’s knowledge or
belief about the employee contrast with some prescriptive stereotype
the employer holds.303 It is the latter group that is most closely
296. Id. at 1112 (“If we were to do so, we would come perilously close to holding
that every grooming, apparel, or appearance requirement that an individual finds
personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her own self-image, can create a triable
issue of sex discrimination.”). The court did emphasize that its holding did “not
preclude, as a matter of law, a claim of sex-stereotyping on the basis of dress or
appearance codes,” id. at 1113; in fact, it suggested an openness to “case[s] where the
dress or appearance requirement is intended to be sexually provocative, and tending
to stereotype women as sex objects,” id. at 1112.
297. See id. at 1113 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 1116.
299. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y, 467, 479–86 (2007) (analyzing Jespersen to show that “the law is
generally incapable, or unwilling, to make the fine distinctions necessary to
determine the propriety of most appearance codes”). This topic is discussed more
fully infra Part IV.A.2.
300. 678 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
301. See id. at 127–28; see also supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing Durkin).
302. See, e.g., Breiner v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 2010)
(female correctional workers “possess an ‘instinct’ that renders them less susceptible
to manipulation by inmates”); Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d
289, 296–97 (4th Cir. 2010) (women cannot be truck drivers); Sassaman v. Gamache,
566 F.3d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (men have a propensity to sexually harass women).
303. “Descriptive stereotypes” refer to generalizing claims about how people are,
such as the claim that women are bad drivers; “prescriptive stereotypes” are beliefs
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analogous to the cognitive stereotyping cases discussed above.304 In
those cases too, the stereotypes in question were thoroughly
prescriptive ones about what “real” men and women should be—
namely, attracted to the opposite sex.305 Beliefs or knowledge about
the plaintiff—cognitive perceptions of his or her sexuality—collided
with these prescriptive stereotypes and an adverse employment action
or harassment resulted.306
As already suggested, plaintiffs frequently win when their
cognitively perceived stereotype violation has to do with being a
parent. The Second Circuit’s decision in Back does not stand
alone.307 In a Fourth Circuit case, the plaintiff was asked during an
interview for a promotion “‘how [her] husband handled the fact that
[she] was away from home so much, not caring for the family.’”308
The man interviewing her went on to admit “he had ‘a very difficult
time’ understanding why any man would allow his wife to live away
from home during the work week.”309 In a more recent First Circuit
case, the plaintiff claimed she was not awarded a promotion after her
employer discovered she had young triplets at home.310 The case
turned on the “stereotype that mothers, particularly those with young
children, neglect their work duties in favor of their presumed
childcare obligations.”311
While four of the twelve cognitive stereotyping “wins” in Table 2
involve knowledge about motherhood,312 the only male caregiver

about how people should be, such as the belief that a woman’s place is in the home.
See Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP.
SOC. 319, 322 (2000) (distinguishing between descriptive and prescriptive
stereotypes).
304. See supra Part III.B.2.
305. See cases discussed supra Part III.B.2 (involving cognitive stereotypes).
306. See supra Part III.B.2.
307. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text (discussing Back v. Hastings
on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004), in which an employer
held the stereotypical belief that a female employee could not adequately commit to
a tenured position because she had children at home).
308. Lettieri v. Equant, Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original).
309. Id.
310. See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2009).
311. Id. The claimed stereotype that mothers neglect their duties is descriptive.
See supra note 303 (clarifying the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive
stereotypes). However, there was also evidence in the record that the plaintiff’s boss
told her she would be happier “down the road” about the promotion not working
out, presumably due to the prescriptive stereotype that mothers should devote their
time to children rather than work. See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 42.
312. In addition to Chadwick and Lettieri, see Maxwell v. Virtual Education Software,
Inc., No. CV-09-173-RMP, 2010 WL 3120025 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 2010), and Matthews
v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., No. 3:05cv226(PCD), 2006 WL 2506597 (D. Conn.
Aug. 29, 2006), both brought by women who alleged that their employer terminated
them because of pregnancy.
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among the plaintiffs in the cases studied lost, perhaps because he did
not make his stereotyping claim explicit.313 Still, the importance of
these parenting cases remains: they provide examples from several
circuits of actionable gender stereotyping based on knowledge about a
plaintiff’s activities outside of work. This, of course, is exactly what
Vickers and the other cognitive stereotyping sexuality cases rejected.314
Whatever Vickers and its kin might suggest, there is no general rule
under Title VII that gender stereotyping must be based on
appearances or behavior observable at work in order to be actionable.
Two cases stand as counterexamples to this Article’s thesis that
courts have required visible stereotype violations only in cases
involving perceived homosexuals. Both cases arise out of the Sixth
Circuit, and both extend Vickers’s holding to presumably heterosexual
plaintiffs. These cases thus provide potential ammunition against this
Article’s claim that Vickers creates a special rule for gay plaintiffs
under Title VII.
The first of these is Willingham v. Regions Bank,315 a case brought by
a female banker who was fired after she appeared on the cover of a
motorcycle magazine as “Ms. Cruzin’ South August 2008.”316
Willingham’s employer fired her on account of her appearance in
the magazine.317 Applying Vickers, the district court found her
termination permissible under Title VII.318 The crucial fact, the court
reasoned, was that the plaintiff’s violation of gender stereotypes—her
failure to “dress or appear ‘conservatively’ at all times”—occurred as
part of a “non-work-related activity.”319 The court failed to address the
313. See Palomares v. Second Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., No. 10-cv-6124, 2011
WL 760088, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2011) (“Camarena’s familial status as a
‘primary caregiver’ is not a protected class under Title VII absent sexual stereotyping.”
(emphasis added)). A married couple also brought a Title VII claim after receiving
stereotypical comments about expected absences due to their twin babies. Adler v. S.
Orangetown Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05 Civ. 4835(SCR), 2008 WL 190585, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2008). Their claim failed, however, since the adverse treatment
affected both husband and wife equally. See id. at *10 (“By stating claims of
discrimination on the basis of two different genders, Plaintiffs have, in effect,
undercut their ability to maintain a valid sex discrimination claim for either Mr. or
Mrs. Adler.”).
314. See supra Part II.B (detailing how the Vickers court equated sex stereotyping claims
exclusively with claims about stereotypes violated in an “observable way at work”).
315. No. 2:09-cv-02289, 2010 WL 2650727 (W.D. Tenn. July 1, 2010).
316. Id. at *1.
317. Id. at *1–2 (indicating that supervisors collectively reviewed the magazine and
determined that the plaintiff’s appearance in the magazine, which contained photos
of her in a bikini next to cars and motorcycles, violated the bank’s code of conduct).
318. See id. at *3–4.
319. Id. The court failed to consider an alternate ground for its decision: that the
alleged prescriptive stereotype—that workers should dress conservatively—may not
have had anything to do with gender at all, especially in the context of a bank, where
conservative dress is generally required of men and women alike.
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potentially determinative fact that the bank’s prescriptive stereotype
regarding conservative dress might not have had anything to do with
gender at all—particularly in the context of a bank, where a
conservative appearance is often required of men and women alike.320
The second case that possibly cuts against this Article’s thesis is
Maturen v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc.,321 brought by a male worker who
alleged that he was harassed and fired after his wife wrote an email to
the store manager expressing complaints about the store.322
According to the plaintiff, the manager told plaintiff that “he ‘should
learn to control [his] wife and keep her in her place.’”323
Hypothesizing a Price Waterhouse claim on the pro se plaintiff’s behalf,
the magistrate judge argued: “At most, Plaintiff has averred facts that
demonstrate that the store manager held a chauvinistic view that men
should control their wives’ behavior and that, since Plaintiff was
unable to do so, he did not live up to the store manager’s conception
of masculinity.”324 But even if this were the case, the magistrate judge
went on to hold, the stereotype in question would have turned on
knowledge about gender non-conforming behavior outside of
work.325 Under the Vickers test, Maturen’s gender stereotyping claim
was bound to fail.326
A better-pled version of this case reaching the same result would
pose a real challenge to this Article’s thesis. It would show courts
being consistent in culling cases where the gender stereotyping
concerned behavior that, while known at work, occurred outside the
workplace. If, for example, effeminate straight men won their cases
but men who were thought not to “wear the pants in the family” did
not, the dividing line this Article has traced between Prowel and
Vickers, and their many analogues, would not, in fact, be peculiar to
gay claims.
Notably, however, Maturen is the only Title VII case, out of the 117
studied, in which a man’s gender nonconformity did not implicate

320. See id. at *7 (listing the court’s reasons for granting the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment).
321. No. 06-CV-15126, 2007 WL 3173962 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2007).
322. Id. at *3.
323. Id.
324. Id. at *6 (alteration in original).
325. Id. This is only one of several alternative holdings in Maturen. The
magistrate judge also recommended dismissal because the claim was untimely filed
and because the alleged harassment was not severe or pervasive. See id. at *6–7.
326. See id. at *6 (finding that even though the plaintiff may have demonstrated
that he did not meet the manager’s chauvinistic conceptions of masculinity, this was
not enough to assert a claim under Vickers).
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his sexuality.327 Astonishingly, there are simply no other cases in
which a plaintiff was perceived to violate masculine stereotypes
without also being perceived as, or at least labeled, a homosexual.
IV. ANALYZING THE TREND
The descriptive story told in Parts II and III leads to a number of
conclusions worth summarizing at this point. The first is that gender
nonconformity does not equal opposite-gender conformity. Traits
not perceived as feminine may be perceived nonetheless as violating
masculine stereotypes, and vice versa. For this reason, the purported
distinction between gender stereotyping and sexuality claims is
unsustainable. Effeminacy in men is perceived as homosexuality, and
looking “gay” is perceived as a type of gender nonconformity. Beliefs
about homosexuality themselves often, if not always, turn on gender
stereotypes.
Courts are right, then, to acknowledge that
“[s]tereotypical notions about how men and women should
behave”—and, I might add, look—“will often necessarily blur into
ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality.”328
The cases surveyed in the previous two Parts suggest that rather
than trying to separate the gender stereotyping wheat from the
homosexual chaff, courts instead distinguish between two types of
stereotypes: those violated visibly and those whose violations are
cognitively perceived. Or, given the blurring of categories just
endorsed, this distinction might be rephrased in terms of sexuality
rather than stereotyping. Plaintiffs who “look gay” succeed under
Title VII while those merely known or thought to be gay do not.
Courts resist this description. Gender stereotyping, they say, only
concerns “appearance or mannerisms on the job.”329 Thus, Title VII
is said not to protect “merely” known or suspected violations of
gender stereotypes.330 This claim is belied, however, by cases in which
mothers of young children fall victim to gender stereotypes not
because of how they look or act on the job, but because of knowledge
327. Doe v. Brimfield Grade School, 552 F. Supp. 2d 816 (C.D. Ill. 2008), perhaps
offers an example under Title IX. In that case, a grade school boy’s classmates
perceived him as “not man enough” to stick up for himself and therefore hit him in
the testicles several times over the course of a year. Id. at 819–20, 823. The court,
however, did not raise questions about the plaintiff’s sexuality, whether actual or as
perceived by his harassers, see id. at 822–23, likely because the plaintiff was so young.
See id. at 820 n.2 (indicating that the plaintiff was twelve-years old when the
harassment began).
328. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004)).
329. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006).
330. Id. at 764.
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about facts outside of work.331 In those cases, stereotypes based on
cognitive “perceptions” do run afoul of Title VII.332
The upshot is that courts treat “perceived homosexuality” cases
differently from other Title VII stereotyping cases. If the term
“perceived homosexuals” can refer either those seen or thought of
(accurately or not) as gay, courts have protected the former but not
the latter. Employment-discrimination claims brought by perceived
homosexuals survive dismissal or summary judgment if and only if the
perception in question is sensory.
This Part first explains how anomalous this privileging of
appearances is within antidiscrimination law. Second, this Part
discusses why, or even if, this matters. After all, increased protections
for a subset of homosexual employees—those who look or act in ways
seen as “gay”—would seem to be a welcome development, at least for
anyone who shares the First Circuit’s view that discrimination based
on sexual orientation “is a noxious practice, deserving of censure and
opprobrium.”333 Given that some formerly unprotected employees
are now receiving protection under Title VII, why should anyone
quibble about doctrinal coherence or theoretical purity? Answering
that question requires a look at the effects of the distinction courts
have drawn and a consideration of the costs incurred when courts
make the unusual move of privileging appearance over knowledge.
A. Perceptibility in Context
1.

The dominant conception
The emphasis placed on sensory perception in the cases described
in Parts II and III is starkly at odds with the rhetoric of blindness that,
for better or worse, has long driven antidiscrimination law in the
United States.334 American antidiscrimination law, in what Robert
331. See, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2009)
(reversing the district court’s dismissal in favor of the employer who allegedly failed
to promote the plaintiff due to the “stereotype that women who are mothers . . .
neglect their jobs in favor of their presumed childcare responsibilities”).
332. See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text (discussing how women have
brought successful stereotyping claims based on a cognitive perception—namely the
belief that women with children at home cannot commit to their jobs).
333. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999).
However noxious, the harassment at issue in Higgins did not give rise to a cognizable
Title VII claim; the First Circuit said that its task was “to construe a statute[,] . . . not
to make a moral judgment.” Id.
334. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n
view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind . . . .”); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 701 n.14 (2007) (plurality opinion) (citing Justice Harlan’s “color-blind” rhetoric
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Post describes as its “dominant conception,” traditionally identifies
certain proscribed characteristics like race and gender and “speaks as
though [they] could be placed behind a screen and made to
disappear.”335 Hoping to transcend these categories, antidiscrimination
law requires their invisibility, and thus our blindness. In the Title VII
context, “[b]lindness renders forbidden characteristics invisible; it
requires employers to base their judgments instead on the deeper and
more fundamental ground of ‘individual merit’ or ‘intrinsic worth.’”336
The contrast between unseen depths and superficial aesthetics337
gives the metaphor of blindness its power. If sight distracts people
from seeing others as they really are or recognizing their true worth,
then blindness becomes a virtue rather than a defect. Of course, all
of this trades on the dual meanings of perception traced throughout
this Article, for the blindness metaphor is merely the negative of the
metaphor of sight as knowledge. Taken literally, it would be absurd to
say that sight keeps us from seeing people as they are. What this really
means is that literal (or sensory) perception sometimes keeps us from
knowing people as they really are. Antidiscrimination law’s blindness
requires us to forgo literal sight in order to “see” deeper truths.
The familiarity of these metaphors suggests just how unusual the
privileging of perception in gender stereotyping cases really is. As
shown above, almost all of the “perceived homosexuals” who survive
dismissal or summary judgment are those who were persecuted not
“just” because coworkers knew, or thought they knew, something
about them, but instead because coworkers literally saw (or heard)
them appearing or behaving in ways coded as gay.338 The ordinary
hierarchy of sight and knowledge has thus been turned on its head.
In their attempt to evade the Title VII dilemma, courts have focused
not on what people “really are”—the unseen depths of their sexual

and rejecting school districts’ race-conscious school assignment policies); Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 772, 780–82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for a “color-blind”
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause).
See generally Reva B. Siegel,
Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and
Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2000) (discussing “the
blindness trope at the heart of antidiscrimination law”).
335. Post, supra note 17, at 16, 39 (emphasis omitted). See generally Paul Brest, The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976) (providing a canonical discussion of the dominant
conception); Fiss, supra note 18 (same). Post does not endorse the dominant
conception that he describes. See supra note 17.
336. Post, supra note 17, at 11.
337. See supra note 16 (listing Supreme Court cases in which the Justices have
characterized aesthetic interests as flimsy and barely cognizable).
338. See supra Table 1 (categorizing wins and losses for plaintiffs’ visible and
cognized stereotyping claims involving perceived homosexuality).

SOUCEK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

PERCEIVED HOMOSEXUALS

4/2/2014 2:43 PM

769

identity—but rather on how they look. Metaphorical blindness has
been replaced by literal eyesight.
There is a seemingly compelling objection to this claim: namely,
Title VII plaintiffs always have to be seen as part of a protected class
before they can get relief. In other words, the blindness idealized by
antidiscrimination law itself presupposes sight. Courts are forced to
see a worker’s race, for example, in order to determine that
discrimination has occurred “because of”339 race so as to remedy that
discrimination and thereby promote a workplace in which race is no
longer “seen.” How is this any different from courts demanding to
see a worker’s effeminacy or “pizzazz”?
The objection is correct that antidiscrimination law’s proscribed
categories always have to be taken into account in order to satisfy
Title VII’s “because of” requirement. A truly color-blind court would
never have the means to recognize that discrimination had occurred
because of race. But the ultimate goal of removing discrimination
based on a proscribed category like race is, at least according to the
dominant conception, to “render[] yet another attribute of
employees invisible to their employers.”340 Antidiscrimination law
seeks to eliminate society’s use of the proscribed categories, thereby
lessening their salience and making them less visible.
The case law described in Part III produces the opposite result.
Appearances never lose their salience if courts only allow gay and
lesbian plaintiffs to succeed on discrimination claims when their
sexuality manifests itself through visible nonconformity with gender
stereotypes. Employers and workers would always have to remain on
the watch for visible markers of homosexuality, if only to know who is
and is not protected. Imagine a human resources (HR) department
worried about the company’s legal liability for firing, failing to hire,
or allowing the harassment of a homosexual employee. Under
current case law, HR workers would be well-advised to consider
whether the employee “looked gay.” The employee’s look and affect
determines the legality of the company’s actions. Companies need to
know whether their employee is a Vickers or a Prowel.
The difference between this outcome and the color-blind ideal
stems from the fact that, with regard to traits such as race, differential
treatment is proscribed no matter what race the employee is.341 The
339. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (protecting workers from discrimination
“because of” a proscribed trait).
340. Post, supra note 17, at 12.
341. Affirmative action policies and disparate impact claims provide the obvious,
and important, exceptions to this assertion. Insofar as both are opposed, however,
by those enamored with the ideal of color-blindness, the latter would accept the
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law does not allow employers to discriminate against whites but not
Hispanics, or blacks but not Asians. Imagine, counterfactually, a law
that only protected Hispanics. In that world, the question of whether
one is Hispanic would become even more salient than it is presently—
especially to those who wanted to follow the law. As this Article
demonstrates, this is precisely the state of affairs for perceived
homosexuals.
Employers are allowed to discriminate against
“unmarked” homosexuals but not those who are marked or visible.
The result: were Title VII to achieve all of its ends, race would
become irrelevant in the workplace; the perceptible markers of
homosexuality, on the other hand, would become even more
salient—a necessary focus of law-abiding employers’ attention.
2.

Appearance discrimination
The dominant conception’s tendency to privilege inner worth over
outer appearances comes at a price: those discriminated against on
the basis of their appearance often find little sympathy from courts,
which have tended to give such discrimination no more weight than
they give the “mere” appearances themselves. This has long been the
case under Title VII, a fact that can be seen even in a joking
exchange enshrined in the law’s legislative history: when asked by a
colleague whether it would “be considered . . . discrimination if a
person wished to employ a good-looking stenographer instead of an
unattractive stenographer,” a Senator replied, “I have always tried to
exercise that kind of discrimination in my hiring practice.”342
There is admittedly some tension here with the ideal of blindness
just described.343 If antidiscrimination law aims for a metaphorical
blindness in the workplace, it would make sense for it to prevent
employers from acting on the basis of workers’ appearances. Yet the
belief underlying antidiscrimination law—that appearances are
superficial and mask one’s inner worth—cuts the other direction as
statement above as a normative matter, if not a descriptive one. The point here is
merely to contrast the logic of the case law described in Parts II and III with the logic
that is otherwise thought to dominate American antidiscrimination law. That said,
the fact that Title VII has been interpreted and amended to allow for affirmative
action and disparate impact suits—neither of which are race-neutral or color-blind—
may give reason, when considered alongside the case law this Article describes, to
question the descriptive accuracy of the widespread assimilationist or trait-blind
understanding of federal employment-discrimination law. I thank Bill Eskridge for
challenging me on this point.
342. 110 CONG. REC. 9026 (1964).
343. Robert Post analyzes this tension at length in his discussion of a proposed
“anti-lookism” ordinance in Santa Cruz, California, which “would prohibit
discrimination against persons on the basis of ‘personal appearance.’” See Post, supra
note 17, at 2.
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well. More often than not, it leads courts to wonder why they should
get involved in a matter of no deep importance.344 Unlike race or
gender, where one side (the prejudiced discriminator) insists on
seeing difference and the other side (the discriminatee) wants color or
gender blindness, appearance discrimination involves sight on both
sides. Harrah’s Casino wants Darlene Jespersen to start wearing
makeup; Jespersen wants to come to work appearing as she has for the
previous twenty years.345 Faced with employers and employees who
both care about something that courts find “trivial,”346 courts have
largely abdicated the field.347 Which is to say, employers have won.
A recent book-length study of appearance discrimination offers as
examples of unsuccessful claims: “Muslim men who refuse to shave,
Muslim women who wear headscarves, Jewish men who wear
yarmulkes, and African American women who braid their hair.”348
Similarly, “[g]rooming codes that require women to wear makeup or
skirts, prevent men from wearing earrings, and restrict transsexuals’
ability to alter their gender identity” also have survived challenge.349 In
all of these cases, courts downplayed the importance of appearance in
comparison to some weightier underlying “identity.”350 As a district
court wrote in one of the most widely discussed of these cases, Rogers v.
American Airlines, Inc.,351 an employer’s regulation of its workers’ hair
styles “has at most a negligible effect on employment opportunity. . . .
344. See generally RHODE, supra note 15, at 99–100 (noting that “[m]ost courts
regard matters of grooming as relatively insignificant concerns, partly because they
reflect voluntary characteristics that victims of bias have the power to change” and
that “[f]ederal judges on both sides of these issues have denounced them as trivial”).
345. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Jespersen did introduce evidence that she finds
it burdensome to wear makeup because doing so is inconsistent with her self-image
and interferes with her job performance.”); see also supra notes 293–98 and
accompanying text (describing Jespersen).
346. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1118 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (criticizing Harrah’s
“decision to let go a valued, experienced employee who had gained accolades from
her customers, over what, in the end, is a trivial matter”). For the majority, “the
subjective reaction of a single employee” to Harrah’s grooming policy was not
enough to merit the law’s protection. Id. at 1113 (majority opinion).
347. See generally RHODE, supra note 15, at 100–01 (indicating that “judges have
been frustrated by plaintiffs who clutter up the courts with claims that high school
hair styles have ‘constitutional significance’” (quoting Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d
49, 52 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (Pell, J., concurring))).
348. RHODE, supra note 15, at 99 (arguing that, even though most courts find
grooming matters insignificant, “individuals see such self-expression as central to
their personal beliefs and religious, racial, or ethnic affiliations”); see also RUTHANN
ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, AND DEMOCRACY FROM
OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 81–88 (2013) (describing the reasons why private
employers have near-absolute power over employees’ work attire).
349. RHODE, supra note 15, at 99–100.
350. See id. at 100.
351. 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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It concerns a matter of relatively low importance in terms of the
constitutional interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VII, rather than involving fundamental rights . . . .”352
Against this backdrop, the privileging of appearances in the cases
discussed in Part III becomes all the more surprising. Consider the
contrast between those cases and Rogers, which involved an AfricanAmerican airline operations agent who had been told not to wear her
hair in “corn row” braids at work.353 Dismissing Rogers’s sex and race
discrimination claims, the court distinguished braids from Afros,
which the court noted might be protected under Title VII.354
According to the court, braids are an easily changed artifice that is
only “socioculturally associated” with race, while Afros are natural
and immutable.355 The result is the exact opposite of the cases in Part
III, in which sociocultural associations—visible stereotypes—were
precisely what mattered to the courts. We need not essentialize
sexuality or settle debates about “nature versus nurture” in order to
feel that Prowel’s clothing choices, clean car, discussion topics, and
even his “pizzazz” were less “natural” or “immutable” than his sexual
orientation.356 Yet the Prowel court, like the courts in Vickers, Dawson,
Rene, and others, offered the possibility of protection from
appearance-based stereotypes rather than those concerning Prowel’s
and other plaintiffs’ affective preferences.357
None of this is to suggest that courts have been justified in
trivializing appearance claims under Title VII. Nor is it to suggest
that Prowel did not deserve the protection he received for his
appearance and affect, however anomalous that protection may be
within ordinary Title VII doctrine. The worry I raise, and return to in
the following section, stems not from the fact that certain appearance
claims have succeeded, but from the fact that, in cases brought by
homosexuals, only such claims have succeeded. Surprisingly, the
distinction courts have drawn threatens to revive the kind of statusconduct distinction regarding homosexuality that the Supreme Court

352. Id. at 231.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 232.
355. Id.
356. See supra Part II.A (discussing Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 F.3d 285 (3d
Cir. 2009)).
357. See Prowel, 579 F.3d at 287; Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763
(6th Cir. 2006); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218, 221 (2d Cir. 2005);
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(plurality opinion).
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has seemingly disclaimed.358 More surprising still, courts do so not to
protect status—that which the discarded distinction was meant to
privilege—but, instead, to protect conduct.359
3.

Covering
The alleged immutability of Afros as compared to braids, as well as
the former privileging of status over conduct, both highlight another
driving concern of antidiscrimination law: protecting people from
treatment based on traits beyond their control.360 The distinction
between immutable and chosen traits provides additional support for
courts’ acceptance of appearance and grooming rules. The deep
unfairness of penalizing employees for traits, like race or gender, that
are largely beyond their control seems lessened when the traits are
chosen.361 Appearances are seen to be the result of choices, and, as
just discussed, trivial choices at that.362
Kenji Yoshino has influentially argued, however, that this refusal to
protect chosen appearances incentivizes certain choices about
appearance.363 In short, it gives those whose appearance or behavior
would subject them to discrimination a strong push toward
assimilation.364 In Yoshino’s words: “[C]ourts will not protect mutable
traits, because individuals can alter them to fade into the mainstream,
thereby escaping discrimination. If individuals choose not to engage
in that form of self-help, they must suffer the consequences.”365
This “assimilationist bias”366 in antidiscrimination law works handin-hand with the law’s ideal of blindness; to stop seeing something,
358. See generally Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010) (“Our
decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context.”).
359. See id. (“While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the . . . law is
targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class.”
(quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment))). See generally Francisco Valdes, The Status/Conduct Distinction and
Sexual Orientation: Exploring a Constitutional Conundrum, 50 GUILD PRAC. 65 (1993)
(suggesting litigation strategies that would help sexual minorities make use of courts’
former emphasis on status over conduct).
360. See Post, supra note 17, at 34 (“It seems to be important that grooming and
dress codes regulate voluntary behavior, for courts tend to conceptualize employees
who present themselves in ways that violate established gender grooming and dress
conventions as asserting a ‘personal preference’ to flout accepted standards.”
(quoting Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976))).
361. See RHODE, supra note 15, at 99.
362. See supra Part IV.A.2.
363. See Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure To Cover, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2006), http://www
.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/magazine/15gays.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing
five seminal cases in which courts have declined to protect plaintiffs from
“covering” demands).
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See Yoshino, supra note 19, at 487; Yoshino, supra note 13, at 779.
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one can either close one’s eyes or cover things up.
Antidiscrimination law demands both. As Yoshino describes it:
“[T]he law’s dominant reaction to difference has been to instruct the
mainstream to ignore it and the outsider group to mute it.”367 This
Article has already shown how courts’ focus on appearances in
sexuality cases sits awkwardly with the ideal of blindness.368 These
cases are no less unusual for the way they implicitly reject the demand
that outsider groups mute their differences.
“Covering demands,” as Yoshino calls them, are pressures on
outsiders to refrain from flaunting their difference; someone who
covers makes it “easy for those around her to disattend her known
stigmatized trait.”369 Covering differs from “passing,” whereby gays
and lesbians “present [themselves] to the world as straight,370 in
somewhat the same way as sensory perception differs from cognitive
perception. Passing turns on what others know; someone who passes
does not want to be perceived (that is, thought of) as gay.371 To cover
one’s sexuality is instead to downplay it; to help others ignore or
forget what they know.372 Thus, covering often involves making
something that is known less visible. It primarily affects visual rather
than cognitive perception.373
Discussing examples of coverable traits, Yoshino notes that
“[e]ffeminate men and masculine women are often assumed to be
homosexual, suggesting that gender and orientation are bundled in
popular consciousness—to be gender atypical is to be orientation
atypical and vice versa.”374 Yet Yoshino asserts that “[e]veryone knows
the flaunting homosexual will generally get less sympathy than the
discreet one.”375 Surveying employment and parenting cases, Yoshino
argued in 2002 that “[i]ndividuals whose homosexuality, even if
avowed, was ‘discreet’ or ‘private’ kept their jobs or children,” while
“[t]hose whose homosexuality was ‘notorious’ or ‘flagrant’ were not
367. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 182 (2006).
368. See supra Part IV.A.1.
369. Yoshino, supra note 13, at 837, 909 (maintaining that covering demands
“appear[] to be the mildest assimilationist demand”). Yoshino inherited the term
“covering” from Erving Goffman, who noted that there were three ways people who
are different can assimilate: by covering (downplaying), passing (hiding), or
converting (altering). See id. at 772 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 50–51, 102–04 (1963)).
370. Id. at 772.
371. See id.
372. Id.
373. There are ways of cognitively covering, however, as when a gay employee
downplays talk of her partner or her weekend activities in order to “fit in.” For
examples, see id. at 845–48 (detailing different covering strategies).
374. Id. at 844.
375. YOSHINO, supra note 367, at 101; accord Yoshino, supra note 13, at 850.
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so fortunate.”376 The survey of cases in Parts II and III of this Article
points to the exact opposite conclusion. In those cases, “flagrant”
gays like Prowel and Rene received protection, while those, like
Vickers, who were more discreet saw their cases dismissed. In recent
Title VII case law, the more pizzazz the better.
The demand that “individuals act according to the stereotypes
associated with their group” is a phenomenon Yoshino himself
identifies and opposes; he calls it “reverse-covering.”377 But Yoshino
writes of his
sense—admittedly impressionistic—that the dominant group more
routinely requires reverse covering in the sex/gender context than
in the orientation or race contexts. This may be because
stereotypically feminine traits are more likely to be valued as
appropriate to at least some spheres of life. The stereotypically
feminine attributes of nurture, empathy, intuition, and so forth,
were and are valued in the domestic sphere. In contrast, there are
fewer spheres in which traits stereotypically associated with
homosexuals or racial minorities are valued.378

Writing in 2006, Yoshino noted “only one legal context in which such
reverse-covering demands have been made [of gays and lesbians]—
the immigration context, in which gay asylum seekers have to prove
they are ‘gay enough’ to establish a colorable fear of persecution.”379
376. YOSHINO, supra note 367, at 101; see also Yoshino, supra note 13, at 776 (“As
time progresses, I posit that more and more discrimination against gays will take the
form of covering demands, rather than taking the historical forms of categorical
exclusion or ‘don’t ask, don’t tell.’”).
377. YOSHINO, supra note 367, at 23.
378. Yoshino, supra note 13, at 910. It may also be that reverse covering is
required of women not because stereotypically feminine traits are valued in domestic
spheres, but rather because this exaggerates differences between men and women in
the workplace, thereby reinforcing self-perceptions of masculinity prized by male
workers whose dominant status is threatened by moves toward gender equality. See
generally McGinley, supra note 63, at 721–25 (explaining the dominance of
masculinity in the workplace and the ways in which it is perpetuated). I am grateful
to Vicki Schultz for pointing this out to me.
379. YOSHINO, supra note 367, at 93. The reference to asylum law suggests an
important comparison that only underscores the strangeness of the Title VII cases
described in this Article. In asylum cases, applicants generally must show that they
have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of some protected ground. See 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B) (2012).
The literal visibility of one’s
sexuality—the extent to which refugees’ behavior or appearance allows others to
perceive them as gay—is relevant to their chance of being persecuted. Put simply, a
flamboyant man is more likely than a stereotypically masculine one to be targeted for
persecution by those looking to target homosexuals. Thus, requiring literal visibility
may prove relevant to asylum law’s future-looking, “well-founded fear” criterion,
though it is potentially objectionable for other reasons. See Fadi Hanna, Case
Comment, Punishing Masculinity in Gay Asylum Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 913, 915–16
(2005); Brian Soucek, Comment, Social Group Asylum Claims: A Second Look at the New
Visibility Requirement, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 337, 344–45 (2010). By contrast, the
relevance of visibility to Title VII claims, where alleged discrimination has already
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This Article shows that as a descriptive matter, Yoshino’s observations
about reverse covering are no longer accurate in the Title VII
context. His theory cannot account for courts’ recent reliance on
appearances and their pressure on gays to reverse cover.
Yoshino’s analysis of covering thus presents a third tension with the
case law described in this Article. To recall, the first was that the
privileging of visibility in sexuality discrimination cases runs counter
to the dominant conception of American antidiscrimination law,
which valorizes blindness as a way of valuing inner worth over outer
appearances.380 Those who endorse the dominant conception or
adopt its rhetoric—and I do neither here—will be hard-pressed to
justify the line (visibly) drawn in the sexuality cases.
The second tension was one of doctrine: ordinarily, appearance
discrimination goes largely unprotected, since appearances are often
seen as (1) superficial and (2) chosen rather than immutable.381
Recent victories for plaintiffs who are seen as gay—and thus have
appearance discrimination claims of a sort—thereby stand out from
the surrounding case law. Given courts’ frequent disparagement of
appearance-based claims, their recent sympathy for visible, and only
visible, signs of homosexuality is baffling.
Finally, Yoshino offers a descriptive doctrinal account and a
prescriptive theory both of which are in tension with the cases
collected in this Article. Where Yoshino finds an assimilationist bias
in antidiscrimination law,382 these cases show covering to be a sure
path to a failure. And insofar as these cases promote reverse
covering, they fail Yoshino’s normative demands as well, for he sees
covering and reverse covering as equal threats to individual
autonomy.383 Just as someone who downplays his or her sexuality fails
to act authentically, so too does someone who feels pressure to
conform to, or even play up, behaviors stereotypically associated with
one’s sexuality.384 Reverse covering pressures are like minstrelsy in
occurred, is entirely unclear. Given this crucial difference, it is not possible to
extrapolate from asylum—Yoshino’s one example of courts making reverse covering
demands on homosexuals—in order to explain the reverse covering demands
currently being made in Title VII cases.
380. See supra Part IV.A.1.
381. See supra Part IV.A.2; see also Yoshino, supra note 363 (pointing out cases in
which courts have allowed discrimination based on mutable characteristics but failed
to allow discrimination based on immutable characteristics).
382. See supra note 366.
383. See YOSHINO, supra note 367, at 191 (“I am equally opposed to demands that
individuals reverse cover, because such demands are also impingements on our
autonomy, and therefore on our authenticity.”).
384. Cf. id. at 147 (“In response to white demands that African-Americans ‘act
white,’ some African-Americans have developed a culture of ‘acting black.’”).
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their demand that a group conform to stereotypes and thereby
appear and act in ways chosen not by themselves but by a dominant
group, allowed to sit back and watch.
Were it not for worries of this sort, it might be tempting to dismiss
these cases’ tensions with existing theory and doctrine, or to ignore
the fact that no court has ever provided a reasoned explanation for
drawing a line between cognitive and sensory stereotypes regarding
homosexuals. After all, no matter their reasoning, courts have been
granting some gay and lesbian employees protections that were
previously lacking under Title VII. Protecting some workers, even on
dubious grounds, might well seem preferable to forgoing protection
altogether in the name of theoretical purity.
Yet we might feel otherwise if the dividing line that courts have
drawn around the protected subset of workers induced broader
harms. Yoshino’s work suggests the possibility that, by encouraging
reverse covering, courts might be endangering the autonomy of those
they purport to protect.385 The worry is that courts are saving
plaintiffs from gender stereotyping only by forcing them into even
more narrow stereotypes. The following section argues that this is
only one of the potential harms the courts’ current line-drawing
might cause, both in the workplaces that Title VII directly regulates
and in society at large.
B. The Effects of Perceptibility
The Title VII dilemma described in Part I has prompted courts to
search for some way to avoid equating the gender stereotyping of
perceived homosexuals with sexual orientation discrimination. But
even once we recognize why courts might want to stop short of fully
writing sexuality into Title VII, the question remains: Why have
courts drawn the particular line that they have? Why have they
privileged appearances in cases brought by plaintiffs perceived as
gay—and solely in those cases?
If antidiscrimination law is a “social practice that acts on other
social practices,” as Robert Post argues in his “sociological account” of
antidiscrimination law, then the relevant question is how the practice
that has arisen in Title VII case law promises to transform the “social
identities” of the gay and lesbian employees it touches.386 As Post
writes, “[t]he sociological account does not ask whether ‘stereotypic
impressions’ can be eliminated tout court, but rather how the law
385. Id. at 93; see also supra note 379 and accompanying text.
386. See Post, supra note 17, at 31 (emphasis omitted).
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alters and modifies such impressions.”387 For Post, then, it comes as
no surprise that courts are not actually busy striking out “the entire
spectrum” of gender stereotyping.388 The challenge is to articulate
the principles that guide, or should guide, what interventions courts
do make into the social practice of gender stereotyping.389 Instead of
seeking blindness, we need to look instead at the ways the law
changes how we see.
The question of courts’ motivation in drawing the line between
visible and cognized stereotypes can thus be more usefully phrased as
a question about effects. Instead of psychologizing about judges, we
can instead look at the likely effects of their judgments.390 Phrasing
the question in terms of effects rather than intentions allows us to
consider further the worry raised at the end of the last section: that
the line of cases discussed in Parts II and III might prove not just
theoretically or doctrinally peculiar, but actually harmful in practical
terms. The subsections below trace three ways in which the
appearance/cognition distinction that drives courts’ gay stereotyping
decisions might embody, or even reinforce, the homophobia that
courts presumably hoped to counteract. Courts have recently begun
extending Title VII’s protections to a certain portion of gay and
lesbian plaintiffs, but at what cost?
1.

Sidestepping disgust
Viewed against a longstanding philosophical tradition in which the
intellect has routinely been ranked above the senses,391 courts’
387. Id.
388. See id. at 36 (emphasis omitted) (“If the point of antidiscrimination law is to
transform existing social practices, then courts must ask what purpose the law
expects to accomplish by such transformations.
The dominant conception
systematically obscures this question. If the aim of the law is not in fact to strike ‘at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes,’ then what is it?” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cnty. of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981))); cf. id. at 27 (describing the goal of striking out
the entire spectrum of stereotyping as “merely obfuscatory”).
389. See id. at 31 (“In contrast to the dominant conception, the sociological
account accepts the inevitability of social practices. But precisely because of this
acceptance, the account requires that principles be articulated that will guide and
direct the transformation of social practices.”).
390. If intent can be presumed from the natural consequences of an act,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring), the question
of courts’ intent in this area may prove equivalent to the question of what effect the
cases I study will likely have.
391. This tradition extends, famously, from PLATO, SYMPOSIUM (Benjamin Jowett
trans., Project Gutenberg 2008) (c. 360 B.C.E.), available at http://www.gutenberg.org
/files/1600/1600.txt (praising those who, “beholding beauty with the eye of the
mind,” are able “to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities”), and ARISTOTLE,
DE ANIMA (ON THE SOUL), bk. II, at 155–88 (Hugh Lawson-Tancred, trans., Penguin
Books 1986) (c. 350 B.C.E.) (describing the nutritive powers of plants, the perceptive
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privileging of that which is seen over that which is thought may
appear counterintuitive. It makes more sense, however, when the
thing being thought concerns sex, and particularly gay sex. The socalled “ick factor”392 often associated with thoughts of gay sex arises
“not because [people] can’t imagine it, but because they can and
do.”393 And insofar as resistance to equal rights for gays and lesbians
may be motivated by disgust at their sexual practices,394 such disgust
does not come from seeing effeminate body language or a butch
hairstyle; it derives from the thought of what two men or two women
might do in bed.395 Subordinating thought to vision thus allows
courts, like employers and their straight workers, to avoid the disgust
that these thoughts apparently provoke.396

powers of animals, and the power of thought possessed by humans), through RENÉ
DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641), reprinted in RENÉ DESCARTES,
MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY WITH SELECTIONS FROM THE OBJECTIONS AND
REPLIES 22–23 (John Cottingham, trans., 1986) (“I now know that even bodies are
not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect
alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but
from their being understood; and in view of this I know plainly that I can achieve an
easier and more evident perception of my own mind than of anything else.”). For
examples of courts’ tendency to disparage appearances, see supra note 16.
392. See MICHAEL NAVA & ROBERT DAWIDOFF, CREATED EQUAL: WHY GAY RIGHTS
MATTER TO AMERICA 5 (1994) (“The revulsion many men and women feel at the
thought of sexual activity between people of their own sex remains a formidable
obstacle on the path to gay rights. This revulsion, which we call the Ick Factor,
equates distaste with immorality.”); see also Ariel Levy, Prodigal Son, NEW YORKER, June
28, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/06/28/100628fa_fact_levy
(quoting former governor and presidential candidate Mike Huckabee’s argument
against gay marriage: “We can get into the ick factor, but the fact is two men in a
relationship, two women in a relationship, biologically, that doesn’t work the same”).
This “ick factor” is not unique to heterosexuals envisioning homosexual sex. For a
description and analysis of the revulsion felt by some gay men at female bodies and
sexuality, see Eric Rofes, The Ick Factor: Flesh, Fluids, and Cross-Gender Revulsion, in
OPPOSITE SEX: GAY MEN ON LESBIANS, LESBIANS ON GAY MEN 44, 44–45 (Sara Miles &
Eric Rofes eds., 1998).
393. NAVA & DAWIDOFF, supra note 392, at 5.
394. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2010) (asserting that “the politics of disgust” have
lessened but not disappeared in recent years); Paul Rozin et al., Disgust, in
HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 757, 757 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008) (stating
that “[f]or North Americans, elicitors of disgust come from nine domains,” one of
which is sexual behavior); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas
and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1013–14 (2005)
(advocating a rejection of a “politics that trades on appeals to disgust and contagion”
to limit the rights of homosexuals).
395. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 211 (1999) (“[L]ike the racist, many homophobes view objects of their
hatred as dirty people whose fantasized disgusting conduct justifies imagined or
acted-out violence against them.”).
396. It is worth remembering here, again, that courts do not reject cognitivestereotyping claims when the thoughts at issue surround motherhood. See supra
Part III.C.
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Mary Anne Case has described courts’ receptivity, even twenty years
ago, to claims made by gays whose partners were dead, severely
disabled, or imprisoned.397 What those plaintiffs shared were “longterm relationships from which the sexual aspect ha[d] perforce been
removed.”398 The opinions in Prowel and Vickers reveal a similar
dynamic. Strangely, it is Prowel, the admitted homosexual, who
emerges from his case’s statement of facts largely desexualized. His
crossed legs, clean car, and talk of culture399 reflect pop culture’s
vision of a stereotypical gay best friend—Will & Grace’s Jack400—
rather than a fully sexual being. On the contrary, Vickers, despite
never revealing his sexuality, is suggestively described as vacationing
with another man in Florida, where their unseen activities are left to
the imagination.401
Tobias Barrington Wolff recently described the way that society,
and courts in particular, have treated gay sex as something not to be
talked about:
It is not merely incidental that the castigation of same-sex intimacy
in Western cultural history has been accompanied by the urgent
command that such intimacy never be discussed—that it was ‘a
crime not fit to be named,’ ‘the very mention of which is a disgrace
to human nature,’ as Blackstone and Chief Justice Burger would
have it.402

For Wolff, not mentioning same-sex intimacy is part of a larger effort
to efface it altogether—to pretend that it does not exist.403
Indeed, the very language of courts’ opinions joins this effort, even
in cases that provide protection to gay plaintiffs.
One of
employment-discrimination
law’s
most
progressive
recent
developments, the conclusion that sexual orientation is “irrelevant
for purposes of Title VII,”404 itself restates the fiction that these cases
397. Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on
the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1659–
61 (1993).
398. Id. at 1644.
399. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2009).
400. See AMIN GHAZIANI, THE DIVIDENDS OF DISSENT: HOW CONFLICT AND CULTURE
WORK IN LESBIAN AND GAY MARCHES ON WASHINGTON 201 (2008) (quoting a
psychologist’s description of the TV character Jack as “narcissistic, shallow, Cherloving, boy-chasing, fashion-obsessed, showtune-singing . . .—a sturdy stereotype if
there ever was one”).
401. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2006).
402. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform and the Body, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 201, 209 (2012) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger,
C.J., concurring)).
403. See id.
404. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 762 (quoting Rene v. MGM Grand, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061,
1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (plurality opinion)).

SOUCEK.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

PERCEIVED HOMOSEXUALS

4/2/2014 2:43 PM

781

have nothing to do with homosexuality. Cases like Prowel discuss
winning claims in terms of gender stereotyping even when those
stereotypes are inescapably coded as “gay.”405 Doing so allows them to
sidestep the disgust engendered by thoughts of gay sex. By focusing
on appearances rather than sexual behavior outside of work, courts
create an appearance of their own. They make it look as if they have
not used employment-discrimination law to force employers to
stomach the presence of employees who provoke their disgust. The
line of cases discussed in Part III makes it look as though, barring
Congressional intervention, gays and lesbians will remain unprotected
under Title VII; meanwhile, something else—nonconformity with
gender stereotypes—allows a few plaintiffs, who just happen to be gay, to
win their cases. This, of course, is a fiction, for all the reasons already
claimed. But it is a fiction that reenacts the “erasure” of gay sexuality
that Wolff has described as the very “strategy around which antigay and
anti-transgender policies are structured.”406
2.

Divorcing Title VII from broader gay rights efforts
Courts’ emphasis on appearances and affect does more than
sidestep potentially uncomfortable thoughts about homosexuality. It
also segregates Title VII case law from broader efforts being made in
the courts on behalf of gay rights.
One fact is inescapable in the cases described in Part III: courts have
failed to protect what some have called “normal” gays,407 that is to say,
those who are the most assimilationist or “straight acting.”408 It is
striking that in Title VII cases, courts have failed to support the very
subset of gays who have elsewhere made the most pressing demands on
judges to move ahead of the political branches on gay rights issues.409
By rewarding gay litigants in Title VII cases when they differ visibly
from the “normal,” courts disconnect employment-discrimination

405. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292; see cases cited supra Part III.B.1.
406. Wolff, supra note 402, at 211, 220 (“For antagonists who find the mere
thought of gay sexuality overwhelming and invasive, erasure is the only
answer . . . .”).
407. Of course this freighted term gets its content largely, if not exclusively,
through societal stereotypes. That is the whole point. Having acknowledged this, I
remove the scare quotes going forward.
408. See YOSHINO, supra note 367, at 60, 77 (defining “normals” as “openly gay
individuals who embrace a politics of assimilation” and contrasting them with “queers”
who “emphasize their difference from the mainstream”). Compare ANDREW SULLIVAN,
VIRTUALLY NORMAL:
AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 198–99 (1995)
(promoting an assimilationist approach to gay rights), with MICHAEL WARNER, THE
TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 54–55 (1999)
(critiquing assimilation as conformity to heterosexual norms).
409. See infra notes 410–13.
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claims from broader equality arguments being made elsewhere in the
law, particularly in areas like marriage and parenthood.
Consider in this connection Yoshino’s description of “the public
face of gay rights”: the “straight-acting”410 men and, I might add, the
long-partnered lesbian couples often presented as plaintiffs in gay
rights litigation. As Yoshino observes, “progay litigation and public
relations are driven by the same imperative—present gays as identical
to straights in all ways except orientation, as if conducting a
controlled experiment.”411
In litigation for same-sex marriage, against the Defense of Marriage
Act and, previously, “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” or on behalf of adoption
rights for gays and lesbians, gay individuals or couples seek equal
inclusion in a mainstream institution: marriage, the military, and
parenthood.412 Given that in each of these cases, the plaintiffs made
assimilationist demands, it is hardly surprising that litigators would
present plaintiffs who already look the part. At heart, these cases share
the logic of the dominant conception of antidiscrimination law.413
They aim for an equality which is at the same time an erasure of
difference. By presenting gays and lesbians who are otherwise
identical to heterosexuals, these cases comprise part of a larger project
to make people stop “seeing” others through the lens of sexuality.
The recent Title VII cases clearly have no place in this project. As
this Article has shown, the case law under Title VII has the exact
opposite effect: it encouraged employers and fellow employees to see
people, literally, in terms of their sexuality. The plaintiffs who have
won their gender stereotyping claims are those whose “otherness” is
literally visible. They are gays and lesbians who flaunt, not ones who
might be mistaken for “normal.” They are precisely not the plaintiffs
of gay rights litigation in general.
By recognizing and protecting appearances, courts have found a
way to grant employment-discrimination claims brought by gays and
lesbians without treating those claims as identity-based. Courts have
protected a group united not by their sexual orientation so much as
by their look and manner. And in doing so, courts have isolated their
410. YOSHINO, supra note 367, at 80.
411. Id.
412. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83 (2013)
(constitutional challenge to the federal government’s limitation of marriage to
opposite-sex partnerships); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir.
2008) (constitutional challenge to the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy);
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 806–07, 809
(11th Cir. 2004) (constitutional challenge to a Florida statute that prohibited gays
and lesbians from adopting children).
413. For a description of this dominant conception, see supra Part IV.A.1.
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Title VII judgments from broader legal fights in which judges are
asked to say that gays and lesbians are, but for their sexual
orientation, otherwise indistinguishable from the majorities who
enjoy broader rights.
3.

Creating difference
Even more troubling than these potential political effects are the
pressures these cases place on workers and workplaces. By protecting
appearance and affect, courts provide incentives for gay employees to
flaunt. Yoshino, as we have seen, worries that this will lead to
inauthenticity.414 But the problems run still deeper.
Critics of Yoshino, and of diversity-based theories of
antidiscrimination law in general, have argued that worries about
inauthenticity require some positive account of authenticity, one that
does not itself rely on stereotypes about what it means to be a member
of a particular group.415 Vicki Schultz has alleged that diversity
proponents too often assume that “authentic” group differences are
exogenous to the workplaces regulated by Title VII; instead, she
argues, differences among groups are in many ways produced within the
workplace (and, of course, other institutions as well).416
According to what Schultz terms the “disruption model” of
antidiscrimination law, discrimination consists of “assigning individuals
to dichotomous in-groups and out-groups, and making that group status
salient in a particular institutional context.”417 The law’s goal, she
argues, should be to “disrupt this process of creating differences.”418
Troublingly, the approach taken by courts in the cases discussed in
this Article actually contributes to, rather than disrupts, the
production of difference in the workplace. By incentivizing workers
to flaunt and requiring employers to attend to gay-coded appearance
and affect, courts reinforce the perceived differences separating gay
and straight employees. They promote a state of affairs, in fact, in
which those differences are literally made visible.

414. See YOSHINO, supra note 367, at 190–91.
415. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, The Prohibition Era, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 20,
2006), http://www.tnr.com/article/the-prohibition-era (reviewing YOSHINO, supra
note 367).
416. See Vicki Schultz, Antidiscrimination Law as Disruption: The Emergence of a
New Paradigm for Understanding and Addressing Discrimination 9–10 (May 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also RICHARD THOMPSON FORD,
RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 4 (2005) (arguing against antidiscrimination theorists
who promote a right to “cultural difference” or “identity correlated traits”).
417. Schultz, supra note 416, at 22.
418. Id. at 21.
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Schultz writes of practices that “assign[] notions of what it means to
be a member” of a particular group and then “structur[e] material
benefits and social interactions in such a way as to confirm the
existence of such presumed group-based differences.”419 It is hard to
think of a better description of what courts have done in cases like
Prowel. In the perceptible stereotyping cases described in Parts II and
III, courts offer a list of traits, which, if exhibited in an “observable
way at work,”420 lead to the material benefits offered by Title VII.
The problem is not just that, in order to receive protection from
stereotyping, workers have to conform to stereotypes catalogued in
court opinions like Prowel. The problem is also that by encouraging
this practice, courts widen the gap even further, and more visibly,
between in-groups and out-groups in American workplaces.
4.

Parallels to the forms of homophobia
William Eskridge has described three mutually reinforcing forms
that homophobic prejudice often takes.421 In its hysterical guise,
homophobes think of gays and lesbians as dirty people doing
disgusting things.422 As an obsessional prejudice, homophobes fear
that gays are conspiring against them, seeking advantage.423 In its
narcissistic form, homophobes put homosexuals in the category of
“‘the Other,’ a group whose differentness helps the homophobe
define her or his own sexual identity.”424 These three forms of
homophobia correspond tightly—and troublingly—to the three
worries just canvassed.425
First, disgust.426 Thoughts of unseen sexual acts not only drive
homophobia in its hysterical form, but perhaps also help to explain why
courts have taken such anomalous refuge in appearances in cases
involving homosexuality. Even if squeamishness about gay sex does not
motivate courts’ reasoning in these cases, the opinions themselves
continue a history in which gay sexuality is treated as unmentionable.
The opinions’ insistence on categorizing the claims as instances of
gender stereotyping rather than sexuality simply reenacts this silencing.

419. Id. at 12.
420. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006).
421. ESKRIDGE, supra note 395, at 211 (describing how homophobia resembles
other forms of prejudice in its hysterical, obsessional, and narcissistic qualities (citing
ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES 32–36, 157–58 (1996))).
422. Id. (stating that homophobia echoes racial prejudice in this regard).
423. Id. (analogizing homophobia to anti-Semitism).
424. Id. (correlating this form of prejudice with sexism).
425. See supra Part IV.B.1–3.
426. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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Second, by privileging the subset of Title VII plaintiffs who are
visibly at odds with those generally bringing assimilationist gay rights
claims,427 courts appear responsive to worries, expressed most often in
marriage debates, that gays and lesbians are conspiring for “special
rights.”428 Separating the progress made by a certain type of gay
plaintiff in employment-discrimination law from that being made
elsewhere in the law allows courts to sidestep the concerns of those
who see protections like those enshrined in ENDA as a stepping-stone
to same-sex marriage.429 Doing so may minimize backlash, but insofar
as ENDA-like protections are a stepping-stone to broader gay rights,
courts may be hampering that movement. Moreover, the concerns of
conspiracy theorists—those who see gays and lesbians as conspiring for
rights430—are reinforced and even embodied by the many courts that
write of homosexuals trying to “bootstrap” their way into Title VII.431
Finally, by incentivizing perceptible differentiation, courts
contribute to the “othering” of gays and lesbians.432 This worry is
perhaps the most troubling one of all, for it suggests that by granting
a subset of gays and lesbians protection under Title VII, courts might
actually be bolstering perceived differences between gay and straight
workers, increasing rather than disrupting the salience of sexual
orientation in the workplace, and reinforcing an us-versus-them
mentality in which balkanized factions of workers compete in what is
seen as a zero-sum game.433

427. See supra Part IV.B.2.
428. See Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller & Neal Milner, Rights as Excess: Understanding
the Politics of Special Rights, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1075, 1083 (2003) (describing
attempts to characterize gay marriage litigation as “a blatant power grab by a
powerful special interest group” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
429. See, e.g., Letter from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops to the U.S.
Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions (July 9, 2013), available at http:
//www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/labor-employment/upload
/joint-letter-on-enda-senate-help-2013-07-09.pdf (“We have already seen state
Supreme Courts repeatedly rely on state-level ENDAs as a basis for creating a state
constitutional right to same-sex ‘marriage.’”).
430. See, e.g., Curtis M. Wong, GLAAD, HRC and Other LGBT Advocacy Groups Are an
‘Evil Conspiracy, Bryan Fischer Claims, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2013, 4:07 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/23/bryan-fischer-glaad_n_4151335.html
(referencing a column written by the senior analyst of the American Family Association).
431. See supra note 2 (referencing cases in which courts characterized plaintiffs as
trying to “bootstrap” sexual orientation discrimination claims into Title VII’s protections).
432. See supra Part IV.B.3.
433. See generally Zatz, supra note 158 (arguing against a conception of Title VII
that would see groups as locked in antagonistic relationships wherein discrimination
against the other group creates advantages for one’s own).
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CONCLUSION: ENDA AND THE FUTURE

If the case law as it currently stands poses the threats just described,
what is to be done? In one sense, this is the least interesting question
of this Article, for the answer is obvious. Were the House of
Representatives to join the Senate in passing ENDA434 or a similar law,
the Title VII dilemma would dissolve, having lost its second premise:
Congress’s failure to explicitly protect sexual orientation. Passing
ENDA would offer gay and lesbian workers protection from
discrimination that the First Circuit has called a “noxious practice,
deserving of censure and opprobrium,”435 that the Second Circuit has
castigated as “morally reprehensible whenever and in whatever
context it occurs,”436 and even the Ninth Circuit’s dissenters in Rene
described as “appalling and deeply disturbing.”437
This Article’s goal has not been to argue for ENDA, however. In
fact, the preceding argument enters that debate only indirectly. The
Article’s aim has been instead to correct the standard story told about
gay workers and Title VII to show that, in cases involving perceived
homosexuality, courts have settled on a strange and unstable
compromise: protecting only those who look or act sufficiently “gay”
at work. This is a result that should come as a surprise to most, for it
belies the conventional wisdom that sexuality claims uniformly fail
under federal employment-discrimination law. Moreover, it runs
counter to standard theoretical and doctrinal stories about the role of
appearances within antidiscrimination law in general.
What this discussion shows is that courts, faced with the Title VII
dilemma, yet uncomfortable with the treatment some gays and
lesbians experience in the workplace, have crafted a largely
unnoticed, de facto ENDA of their own. It is an ENDA that no
imaginable Congress would pass. And as Part IV suggested, it is quite
possibly an ENDA that we should not want.
What makes this Article an indirect intervention into the ongoing
debate over the real ENDA is its revelation that the choice facing
Congress is not, as the standard story would have it, between ENDA

434. The most recent version is the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013,
S. 815, 113th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013).
435. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999).
436. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000). The Third Circuit has
also chimed in. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir.
2001) (“Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our society.”).
437. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1078 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (Hug, J., dissenting). The dissent rejected the plaintiff’s claim, stating it was
not the court’s role “to make a moral judgment,” but rather to construe the law as
written by Congress. Id. (quoting Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259).
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and a status quo in which gays and lesbians get no protection under
Title VII. That description of the status quo is simply no longer true.
In the federal courts today, “visible” homosexuals—those who look or
act sufficiently gay in the eyes of coworkers and courts—often already
do get protection.
I do not know, frankly, how this revised understanding of the status
quo might affect the debate over ENDA were it better understood.
Would conservatives still want to preserve the status quo under Title
VII if they knew that employers can discriminate against
assimilationist gays, but not ones who flaunt? Would liberals
redouble or relax their efforts for full protection, knowing that some
protection is already on offer, but that this might, in some ways, be
worse than no protection at all? It is quite possible that the current
state of the law in this area is one that no party in the debate would
choose. That is an important point to realize as the choice between
ENDA and the status quo continues to be debated.
This Article’s argument also raises a warning about ENDA itself.
ENDA proscribes employment discrimination based on “actual or
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity”438—where “sexual
orientation” is defined as “homosexuality, heterosexuality, or
bisexuality,”439 and “gender identity” is defined as “the gender-related
identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related
characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the
individual’s designated sex at birth.”440
These provisions make clear that, after ENDA’s passage, cases like
Brian Prowel’s441 could proceed directly as sexuality discrimination
claims rather than claims of gender stereotyping. Or, depending on
how courts treat gender stereotyping claims after ENDA, someone
like Prowel could perhaps bring an intersectional claim as an
effeminate gay man. Whether courts will continue reading “sex” in
Title VII expansively once sexuality and gender identity (including
gender-related appearance and mannerisms) are covered elsewhere
in federal law is an open question, however. Perhaps Prowel’s
intersectional claim would not be sex (Title VII) plus sexual
orientation (ENDA), but rather sexual orientation and gender
identity, both as covered under ENDA.

438. S. 815, § 4.
439. Id. § 3(a)(10).
440. Id. § 3(a)(7).
441. See supra Part II.A (discussing Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285
(3d Cir. 2009)).
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But what about Christopher Vickers?442 Were he actually gay,
Vickers’s claim would indisputably be covered under ENDA.443 But
even though Vickers was thought to be gay, his actual sexuality was
never revealed either at work or in court.444 Read straightforwardly,
ENDA would seem to protect Vickers through the phrase “actual or
perceived sexual orientation,” repeated thirteen times in the bill.445
This should be read to mean that ENDA protects employees from
discrimination based on what others think their sexual orientation to
be.
That is to say, “perceived sexual orientation” in ENDA
undoubtedly concerns thought, not vision.
This is the very assumption proven wrong, however, in Vickers and
the many cases like it. Current Title VII case law more often offers a
literalist reading of perception instead, however bizarre the results.446
Were ENDA’s language about “perceived sexual orientation” read
literally, employees would be protected if they were gay, or if they
were not gay but looked gay. Yet Vickers and others merely thought
to be gay might still fall through the cracks. This may sound absurd,
but it is only slightly stranger than the current state of affairs in which
gay employees must look or act sufficiently gay to receive protection
under Title VII. The pervasiveness of perceptibility in ENDA makes it
all the more possible that courts’ literal reading of perception could
linger. As so often with questions of visibility, we might just have to
wait and see.

442. See supra Part II.B (discussing Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th
Cir. 2006)).
443. Or rather, a claim like his would be covered if it alleged conduct that
occurred after ENDA went into effect.
444. See supra text accompanying note 126.
445. See S. 815 §§ 4, 9 (emphasis added).
446. In this regard, Title VII case law is not alone. For a parallel example in
asylum law, see Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 153,
153–54, 158–59 (2012), and Soucek, supra note 379, which both criticize courts’
literalist understanding of persecuted groups’ so-called “social visibility” in the
context of asylum law. For a further discussion of this parallel, see supra note 379.

